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Introduction  
Today, the success of neighbouring countries’ social models is often referred to when one’s 
own country is stuck with a complicated reform.  Governments and corporate managements 
also regularly mention the advantages of this model to suggest transposing it. 
It’s the case in France for instance where, in some cases, the British social model is praised 
for its flexibility or, in other instances, the German model for its co-determination principle. 
But is it possible to transpose something considered as a success in another country? Can an 
agreement signed in an Italian company become a reference for a German firm? 
This study is trying to answer these difficult questions, mainly focusing on corporate case 
studies. We thought it would be interesting to focus on the levers used to look for 
competitiveness through collective bargaining in companies in 4 countries (France, Germany, 
Italy and United Kingdom). 
What are the levers used?  Are they the same everywhere?  Can they really be transposed? 
Remember that each country has its own history, collective bargaining organization and 
stakeholders, and that all these elements build a special industrial relations model. 
This was verified with the latest reforms encouraged by the European Commission these last 
two years.  Reforms affecting pensions, unemployment insurance or the labour market were 
only possible via compromises reached in each country. 
The last two Notes de conjoncture sociale done by Entreprise&Personnel focus on these 
reforms in the European Union.  Some were done by the lawmaker and/or with the social 
partners. 
However, before we start analysing company collective agreements on competitiveness (III), 
we will spend some time on the general principles of industrial relations in individual 
countries (I) and on recent collective bargaining changes (II).  Such immersion is necessary to 
learn all the lessons. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Reproduction in any form is prohibited without express authorisation of Entreprise&Personnel 
1. Industrial relations in each country:  
a few references 
To better understand the development of collective bargaining in the 4 countries surveyed, 
let us remind the framework within which negotiations fall and evolve. 
For that purpose, we have chosen 3 key starting points, summarized in a synthetic chart, to 
facilitate understanding: 
― The unionization rate and the global functioning of unionization. 
― The rate of collective agreements’ coverage and a few keys to understand collective 
bargaining in these 4 countries. 
― The model of workers representation in businesses, focusing on whether or not there are 
employee representatives on the Board. 
If this picture is not enough for the reader, we suggest they report to the appendixes for 
more details (detailed description of the industrial relations systems). 
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s 
in
 
o
rd
e
r 
to
 
m
ax
im
iz
e
 
co
st
s.
 
G
E
R
M
A
N
Y
 
C
o
lle
ct
iv
e
 
ag
re
e
m
e
n
ts
 
m
ay
 
b
e
 
co
n
cl
u
d
e
d
 o
n
 b
o
th
 t
h
e
 i
n
d
u
st
ry
 
o
r 
se
ct
o
ra
l 
le
ve
l 
an
d
 
th
e
 
co
m
p
an
y 
le
ve
l. 
St
ri
ct
ly
 s
p
e
ak
in
g,
 
co
lle
ct
iv
e
 
se
tt
le
m
e
n
ts
, 
b
y 
la
w
, 
st
ip
u
la
te
 t
h
e
 w
o
rk
in
g 
co
n
d
it
io
n
s 
o
n
ly
 
o
f 
th
o
se
 
e
m
p
lo
ye
e
s 
w
h
o
 
ar
e
 
m
e
m
b
e
r 
o
f 
th
e
 
co
rr
e
sp
o
n
d
in
g 
u
n
io
n
. 
H
o
w
e
ve
r,
 
it
 
is
 
ge
n
e
ra
lly
 
sa
id
 
th
at
 
th
e
 
co
m
p
an
ie
s 
vo
lu
n
ta
ri
ly
 a
p
p
ly
 t
h
e
 
co
lle
ct
iv
e
 p
ro
vi
si
o
n
s 
al
so
 t
o
 t
h
e
 
n
o
n
-u
n
io
n
 m
e
m
b
e
rs
 w
o
rk
in
g 
in
 
th
e
 
co
m
p
an
y 
e
x
ce
p
t 
th
o
se
 
w
h
o
se
 
in
d
iv
id
u
al
 
w
o
rk
in
g 
co
n
tr
ac
ts
 
st
ip
u
la
te
 
m
o
re
 
fa
vo
u
ra
b
le
 
p
ro
vi
si
o
n
s 
th
an
 
th
e
 
co
lle
ct
iv
e
 a
gr
e
e
m
e
n
t.
 
F
u
rt
h
e
rm
o
re
,  
co
lle
ct
iv
e
 
b
ar
ga
in
in
g 
at
 
th
e
 
se
ct
o
ra
l 
le
ve
l 
ca
n
 
b
e
 
ch
ar
ac
te
ri
se
d
 
p
ar
tl
y 
b
y 
p
at
te
rn
 
b
ar
ga
in
in
g.
 
T
h
is
 
h
o
ld
s 
fo
r 
n
e
go
ti
at
io
n
s 
ta
k
in
g 
p
la
ce
 
in
 
th
e
 v
ar
io
u
s 
re
gi
o
n
al
 d
is
tr
ic
ts
 o
f 
o
n
e
 s
p
e
ci
fi
c 
in
d
u
st
ry
. 
P
ro
vi
si
o
n
s 
se
tt
le
d
 
in
 
a 
p
ilo
t 
d
is
tr
ic
t 
se
rv
e
 
as
 
re
fe
re
n
ce
s 
th
at
 
ar
e
 
ad
o
p
te
d
 
as
 
th
e
y 
st
an
d
 
o
r 
sl
ig
h
tl
y 
m
o
d
if
ie
d
 
b
y 
th
e
 
b
ar
ga
in
in
g 
p
ar
ti
e
s 
in
 o
th
e
r 
d
is
tr
ic
ts
. 
 
F
R
A
N
C
E
 
T
h
re
e
 
le
ve
ls
 
o
f 
co
lle
ct
iv
e
 
b
ar
ga
in
in
g:
 
cr
o
ss
-i
n
d
u
st
ry
 
(n
at
io
n
al
),
 
se
ct
o
ra
l 
an
d
 
co
m
p
an
y 
le
ve
l. 
T
ra
d
it
io
n
al
ly
, 
th
e
 
p
ri
n
ci
p
le
 
k
n
o
w
n
 
as
 
“p
re
fe
re
n
ti
al
” 
w
as
 e
st
ab
lis
h
e
d
. 
P
ro
vi
si
o
n
s 
n
e
go
ti
at
e
d
 
at
 
co
m
p
an
y 
le
ve
l 
co
u
ld
 
o
n
ly
 
im
p
ro
ve
 
n
at
io
n
al
 
p
ro
vi
si
o
n
s.
 
 
O
n
ly
 
in
 
re
ce
n
t 
ye
ar
s 
h
as
 
th
is
 
p
ri
n
ci
p
le
 
b
e
e
n
 
u
p
se
t.
 
T
h
e
 
la
w
 c
an
 a
llo
w
 b
u
si
n
e
ss
e
s 
to
 
n
e
go
ti
at
e
 l
o
w
e
r 
ri
gh
ts
 t
h
an
 
in
 t
h
e
 s
e
ct
o
r.
 B
e
si
d
e
s,
 b
u
t 
th
is
 
is
 
w
e
ak
, 
a 
4
th
 
b
ar
ga
in
in
g 
le
ve
l 
is
 
ri
si
n
g:
 
lo
ca
l 
b
ar
ga
in
in
g,
 
w
it
h
 
e
m
p
lo
ym
e
n
t 
m
an
ag
e
m
e
n
t 
b
e
in
g 
th
e
 p
ri
m
ar
y 
th
e
m
e
. 
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h
e
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n
o
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m
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n
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u
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r 
e
m
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ye
e
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n
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e
 
U
K
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d
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o
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t.
 
U
n
io
n
s 
ar
e
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e
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o
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 c
o
m
m
o
n
 w
ay
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h
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e
m
p
lo
ye
e
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e
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p
re
se
n
te
d
 
an
d
 
th
e
y 
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n
 
n
o
w
 
le
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m
p
e
l 
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e
 
e
m
p
lo
ye
r 
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d
e
al
 
w
it
h
 
th
e
m
, 
b
u
t 
o
n
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if
 
th
e
y 
h
av
e
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u
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ie
n
t 
su
p
p
o
rt
. 
M
o
st
 n
o
n
-u
n
io
n
 w
o
rk
p
la
ce
s 
h
av
e
 
n
o
 
e
m
p
lo
ye
e
 
re
p
re
se
n
ta
ti
o
n
, 
an
d
 
th
e
 
re
gu
la
ti
o
n
s 
im
p
le
m
e
n
ti
n
g 
th
e
 
E
U
 
d
ir
e
ct
iv
e
 
o
n
 
in
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io
n
 
an
d
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n
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at
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n
 
h
av
e
 
n
o
t 
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d
 t
h
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 T
h
e
 
m
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n
 
e
m
p
lo
ye
e
 
re
p
re
se
n
ta
ti
ve
 
b
o
d
ie
s 
in
 
It
al
y 
–
 
th
e
 
R
SU
s 
–
 
ar
e
 
e
ss
e
n
ti
al
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u
n
io
n
 
b
o
d
ie
s,
 
e
ve
n
 
if
 
th
e
y 
ar
e
 
la
rg
e
ly
 
e
le
ct
e
d
 
b
y 
al
l 
e
m
p
lo
ye
e
s.
 
T
h
e
 
u
n
io
n
s 
n
o
m
in
at
e
 
th
e
 
ca
n
d
id
at
e
s 
fo
r 
th
e
 
tw
o
-
th
ir
d
s 
o
f 
th
e
 
m
e
m
b
e
rs
 
d
ir
e
ct
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e
le
ct
e
d
 
b
y 
th
e
 
w
h
o
le
 
w
o
rk
fo
rc
e
, 
an
d
 
ch
o
o
se
 
th
e
 
re
m
ai
n
in
g 
th
ir
d
 
th
e
m
se
lv
e
s.
 
G
E
R
M
A
N
Y
 
W
h
ile
 
co
lle
ct
iv
e
 
b
ar
ga
in
in
g 
p
ar
ti
e
s 
in
 t
h
e
 r
e
gi
o
n
al
 d
is
tr
ic
ts
 
ar
e
, 
st
ri
ct
ly
 
sp
e
ak
in
g,
 
au
to
n
o
m
o
u
s 
ac
to
rs
 
th
e
ir
 
st
ra
te
gi
e
s 
an
d
 a
ct
u
al
 b
e
h
av
io
u
r 
ar
e
 
so
m
e
w
h
at
 
co
o
rd
in
at
e
d
. 
T
h
u
s,
 
n
at
io
n
-w
id
e
 
e
x
te
rn
al
 
w
ag
e
 
p
o
lic
y 
e
ff
e
ct
s 
o
n
 
in
te
rn
at
io
n
al
 
co
m
p
e
ti
ti
ve
n
e
ss
 
an
d
 
e
m
p
lo
ym
e
n
t 
ca
n
 
b
e
 
in
te
rn
al
is
e
d
 
b
y 
u
n
io
n
s 
an
d
 
e
m
p
lo
ye
rs
’ 
as
so
ci
at
io
n
s 
(a
t 
le
as
t 
at
 a
 s
e
ct
o
ra
l 
le
ve
l)
.  
 W
o
rk
s 
co
u
n
ci
ls
 
p
ro
vi
d
e
 
re
p
re
se
n
ta
ti
o
n
 
fo
r 
e
m
p
lo
ye
e
s 
at
 
th
e
 
w
o
rk
p
la
ce
 
an
d
 
th
e
y 
h
av
e
 
su
b
st
an
ti
al
 
p
o
w
e
rs
 
–
 
e
x
te
n
d
in
g 
to
 a
n
 e
ff
e
ct
iv
e
 r
ig
h
t 
o
f 
ve
to
 
o
n
 
so
m
e
 
is
su
e
s.
 
A
lt
h
o
u
gh
 
n
o
t 
fo
rm
al
ly
 
u
n
io
n
 
b
o
d
ie
s,
 
u
n
io
n
 
m
e
m
b
e
rs
 
n
o
rm
al
ly
 p
la
y 
a 
k
e
y 
ro
le
 w
it
h
in
 
th
e
m
 
b
y 
la
w
, 
e
m
p
lo
ye
r 
an
d
 
w
o
rk
s 
co
u
n
ci
ls
 
ar
e
 
to
 
co
o
p
e
ra
te
 
w
it
h
 
e
ac
h
 
o
th
e
r 
in
 
su
ch
 
a 
w
ay
 
th
at
 
b
o
th
 
th
e
 
e
st
ab
lis
h
m
e
n
t 
an
d
 t
h
e
 w
o
rk
e
rs
 
b
e
n
e
fi
t.
 W
o
rk
s 
co
u
n
ci
ls
 a
re
 t
o
 
re
p
re
se
n
t 
th
e
 
in
te
re
st
 
o
f 
th
e
 
w
h
o
le
 s
ta
ff
 b
y 
b
e
in
g 
in
fo
rm
e
d
 
b
y 
th
e
 m
an
ag
e
m
e
n
t,
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 A
 
lo
t 
o
f 
o
b
lig
at
io
n
s 
in
 
b
u
si
n
e
ss
e
s,
 
d
e
p
e
n
d
in
g 
o
n
 
st
af
f 
si
ze
. 
 
E
m
p
lo
ye
e
s 
ca
n
 
b
e
 
re
p
re
se
n
te
d
 b
y 
e
m
p
lo
ye
e
 
re
p
re
se
n
ta
ti
ve
s 
as
 
so
o
n
 
as
 
th
e
re
 
ar
e
 
1
1
 
e
m
p
lo
ye
e
s 
in
 
th
e
 
co
m
p
an
y.
 T
h
is
 b
o
d
y 
ai
m
s 
to
 
ra
is
e
 
q
u
e
st
io
n
s 
o
n
 
in
d
iv
id
u
al
 
o
r 
co
lle
ct
iv
e
 
m
at
te
rs
. 
F
o
r 
th
e
 
W
o
rk
s 
C
o
u
n
ci
l 
af
te
r 
5
0
 
e
m
p
lo
ye
e
s,
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
K
e
y
 l
e
v
e
l 
o
f 
B
a
rg
a
in
in
g
 
C
o
v
e
ra
g
e
 
E
m
p
lo
y
e
e
 
R
e
p
re
se
n
ta
ti
o
n
 
(t
h
ro
u
g
h
 l
o
c
a
l 
u
n
io
n
 b
o
d
ie
s 
a
n
d
 
w
o
rk
s 
c
o
u
n
c
il
s 
o
r 
si
m
il
a
r 
st
ru
c
tu
re
s 
e
le
c
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 b
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e
m
p
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y
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 U
K
 
e
m
p
lo
ye
e
s 
h
av
e
 
n
o
 
st
at
u
to
ry
 
ri
gh
t 
to
 
re
p
re
se
n
ta
ti
o
n
 a
t 
b
o
ar
d
 
le
ve
l. 
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Y
 
 T
h
e
re
 
is
 
n
o
 
ri
gh
t 
to
 
e
m
p
lo
ye
e
 
b
o
ar
d
 
le
ve
l 
re
p
re
se
n
ta
ti
o
n
 i
n
 I
ta
ly
. 
G
E
R
M
A
N
Y
 
e
n
fo
rc
in
g 
e
m
p
lo
ye
e
s’
 
in
te
re
st
 
in
 
d
e
ci
si
o
n
-m
ak
in
g 
o
r 
e
ve
n
 
jo
in
tl
y 
d
e
ci
d
in
g 
w
it
h
 t
h
e
 m
an
ag
e
m
e
n
t.
 I
n
 
th
is
 
re
sp
e
ct
, 
th
e
y 
ca
n
 
co
n
cl
u
d
e
 
ag
re
e
m
e
n
ts
 
th
at
 
ar
e
 
b
in
d
in
g 
fo
r 
b
o
th
 
th
e
 
e
m
p
lo
ye
r 
an
d
 
th
e
 
e
m
p
lo
ye
e
s.
 
If
 
a 
co
n
fl
ic
t 
o
f 
in
te
re
st
s 
ar
is
e
s 
at
 t
h
e
 l
e
ve
l 
o
f 
th
e
 
e
st
ab
lis
h
m
e
n
t 
an
d
 
th
e
 
d
is
p
u
te
 
co
n
ce
rn
s 
e
n
fo
rc
e
ab
le
 
co
d
e
te
rm
in
at
io
n
 
ri
gh
ts
, 
th
e
 
w
o
rk
s 
co
u
n
ci
l 
ca
n
 
e
n
fo
rc
e
 
th
e
 
se
tt
in
g -
u
p
 
o
f 
an
 
ar
b
it
ra
ti
o
n
 
co
m
m
it
te
e
. 
If
 
a 
d
is
p
u
te
 
o
ve
r 
ri
gh
ts
 
ar
is
e
s,
 
th
e
 
w
o
rk
s 
co
u
n
ci
l 
ca
n
 a
p
p
ly
 t
o
 t
h
e
 L
ab
o
u
r 
co
u
rt
 f
o
r 
an
 
in
ju
n
ct
io
n
. 
F
in
al
ly
, 
it
 
is
 
su
p
p
o
se
d
 t
o
 m
o
n
it
o
r 
co
m
p
lia
n
ce
 
E
m
p
lo
ye
e
 r
e
p
re
se
n
ta
ti
ve
s  
h
av
e
 a
 
ri
gh
t 
to
 s
e
at
s 
o
n
 t
h
e
 s
u
p
e
rv
is
o
ry
 
b
o
ar
d
 o
f 
la
rg
e
r 
co
m
p
an
ie
s:
 o
n
e
g-
th
ir
d
 
in
 
co
m
p
an
ie
s 
w
it
h
 
5
0
0
 
to
 
2
,0
0
0
 
e
m
p
lo
ye
e
s,
 
h
al
f 
in
 
co
m
p
an
ie
s 
w
it
h
 m
o
re
 t
h
an
 2
,0
0
0
. 
F
R
A
N
C
E
 
th
e
 p
o
in
t 
is
 t
o
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n
fo
rm
 a
n
d
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n
su
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ab
o
u
t 
th
e
 
co
m
p
an
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e
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n
o
m
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 p
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gr
e
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u
si
n
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b
o
d
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e
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h
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n
e
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d
 
w
o
rk
in
g 
co
n
d
it
io
n
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(C
H
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T
),
 a
n
d
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s 
p
o
w
e
r 
is
 g
ro
w
in
g.
 
Si
n
ce
 
2
0
1
3
, 
b
u
si
n
e
ss
e
s 
w
it
h
 
5
,0
0
0
 
w
o
rk
e
rs
 
o
r 
m
o
re
 
in
 
F
ra
n
ce
 
an
d
 
1
0
,0
0
0
 i
n
 t
o
ta
l 
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e
 u
n
d
e
r 
th
e
 o
b
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io
n
 t
o
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e
 a
n
 
e
m
p
lo
ye
e
 
re
p
re
se
n
ta
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ve
 
o
n
 
th
e
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b
o
ar
d
. 
U
n
ti
l 
n
o
w
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w
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o
n
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m
an
d
at
o
ry
 i
n
 p
u
b
lic
 f
ir
m
s 
an
d
 
o
p
ti
o
n
al
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p
ri
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te
 
co
rp
o
ra
ti
o
n
s.
 
T
h
is
 
b
o
ar
d
 
m
e
m
b
e
r 
h
as
 
th
e
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m
e
 
ri
gh
ts
, 
o
b
lig
at
io
n
s 
an
d
 
p
re
ro
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ti
ve
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e
 
o
th
e
rs
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A
 
lo
t 
o
f 
b
u
si
n
e
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e
s 
ar
e
 
w
o
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d
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o
u
t 
th
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 n
e
w
 p
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o
n
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2. Recent changes to collective bargaining 
Collective bargaining is a more or less structuring component of the social model in a lot of 
European countries, but is this model evolving?  What’s new in the wage negotiations in light 
of the new stakes related to the crisis?  Are new bargaining topics debated with the social 
partners? 
1. France: negotiations under more and more pressure 
The collective bargaining framework has drastically changed in France in recent years.  
Remember that, historically speaking, the creation of the social standard is mostly the 
prerogative of the lawmaker.  France is often mentioned for its binding social 
regulations and its heavy Labor Code (more than 3,000 pages). 
However, for several years, especially recently, there has been a strong political will to 
develop compromise via what is known as “French-style collective bargaining,” and 
there are a lot of themes. 
 Since 2007, company negotiations are under pressure 
For several years, businesses have been pressured into launching negotiations on 
societal themes the public authorities want to improve. 
They have now integrated this principle quite well: bargaining a collective agreement or 
developing an action plan on these themes, or paying a fine (1% of the payroll). 
These bargaining obligations were initially introduced to facilitate recruitment for 
disabled employees.  In the absence of negotiations, possible financial sanctions are 
generalized: policy to recruit or maintain seniors in the company, professional equality, 
prevention policy for jobs known as “hard” in the company, and so on.  Stress, 
generation contracts (within the framework of a policy to recruit young people) are 
the latest mandatory themes. 
With a little hindsight, one can see that this method does not give any meaning to 
businesses’ actions in these areas.  In reality, the themes are only addressed via general 
principles; the content is not dealt with and they are not operational in the company. 
Social dialogue remains highly institutional, and this obligation to succeed is often 
detrimental for the negotiation’s outcome.  The primary objective is to avoid paying a 
fine amounting to 1% of the payroll! 
 A new impulse? Collective bargaining on secure employment or 
competitiveness agreements 
It is with the difficult economic and employment context of these recent years that 
you need to understand the expected effects of the mechanisms on secure 
employment. A legal framework was created for the employment maintenance 
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agreements, via a law passed on June 14, 2006. Keeping as many jobs as possible rather 
than laying off in times of crisis by signing “defensive” agreements will be the objective 
of the coming quarters. 
Several European countries have created similar mechanisms. “Derogation clauses” 
included in collective agreements in Germany allow ailing businesses to temporarily 
avoid the provisions contained in the collective agreements and to negotiate company 
agreements1, the possibility for Spanish businesses, with the 2012 labour reform, to 
adapt the work organization to avoid layoffs. (1/3 of businesses with 250 workers or 
more have done this)2. 
One can hardly draw conclusions after the law has been in force for 4 months only. 
Below, we will analyse several so-called competitiveness agreements, but the first 
teachings of these agreements can be summed up in three points: 
 First, the levers used for competitiveness are grouped under 4 types of measures: 
― searching for employment flexibility (cross-site mobility, early employment planning, 
managing temporary work and/or subcontracting); 
― organizational flexibility (searching for flexibility, “searching for collective 
effectiveness”); 
― actions on effective working time (questioning compensation time for extra hours 
worked under the French 35-hour work week law, dividing annual leave, seniority 
days… and redefining annual working time…); 
― controlling pay evolution (pay freeze, removing bonuses primes, renegotiating profit-
sharing agreements). 
 With these levers, businesses revise major procedures in their HR policy (working 
time, pay, employment management). The teams have to be ready to commit 
themselves to issues like the duration of working time, which they had voluntarily 
“forgotten” since the 2000s, because compromises at the time were hard to find! 
 When bargaining for this type of agreement, compensation for activating these 
levers is the company’s industrial and economic plan (rebuilding a 
production/investment chain worth several million euros on the site, maintaining the 
production activity). The issue of the company’s economic performance is raised with 
the social partners and the employees: sharing all the information that leads to these 
options is essential. 
 Union organizations have recently adopted a new position because of the major 
stakes for businesses and their employees. They sign agreements implementing what, 
under other circumstances, would have been considered as social steps back.  
 Corporate social regulations are once again punctuated with the search for direct 
employee participation which, for several years, had been forgotten. Local union 
organizations only commit if they have employees’ support. They need to understand 
the stakes and, to that end, be informed about and trained to economic issues.  But 
achieving a truly shared diagnosis takes time. Continuous social dialogue in the 
company favours commitments on both sides when there is an emergency and avoids 
misunderstandings. Trust needs to be built. 
 Time will tell whether businesses will use this new system prior to economic 
difficulties. 
                                               
1  Planet Labor, article 6559 of October 24, 2012. 
2  Planet Labor, article 7652 of June 24, 2013. 
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 Bargaining collective agreements is not a sign of good social 
dialogue  
According to recent figures included in the 2012 collective bargaining report, never 
have so many agreements been signed in France…at all levels: cross-industry, sectoral, 
and mostly in businesses (+ 5,000 texts compared with 2011!) Is the French social 
model changing? Some say the law on secure employment (labour law reform) will be 
the keystone for future negotiations in businesses on one of the most important 
subject of the moment: employment… Simply, concrete, practical observation of this 
social dialogue modality in businesses allows us to raise doubts as to its impact on 
employees’ everyday life.  When managers and employees are asked about the 
implementation of one agreement in force or another, most answers are fantasist: 
“What are you talking about?” As an example: a company has already signed 9 
company agreements in 2013, and the managers surveyed have never heard of them.  
People outside the company talk about them the best! 
In recent years, collective bargaining has grown as it became mandatory… Opening 
negotiations on stress, seniors, hardness, and professional equality or paying a fine: the 
choice is easily made.  Schedules are always tight: September 30, 2013 for the 
generation contract.  How can one build a true, meaningful employment policy in a few 
months?  When the first agreements came, usually the point was to have a text, with a 
few copy/paste exercises: parts of former senior agreements, provisions from the 
workforce-planning agreement, and formalizing a few HR tools… Managements and 
union organizations are aware that all these topics would require time to think: which 
would be the most relevant measure in the company’s given context?  How to debate 
it with the key interested parties to implement the measures negotiated? 
Some unions organize blogs, forums with employees to try the relevance of measures 
to negotiate.  It’s a good approach but they need to go fast. 
How many collective agreements won’t be implemented, either because they are only 
made up of declarations of intent because they “contractualize” social policies, or 
because the measure was negotiated without taking the operational side into 
consideration.  Signing agreements is not enough to change mindsets and practices. 
Agreements on employement of older workers are a particularly striking example. 
Remember also that, to negotiate in a company, you need to have union 
representatives, and the current affiliation rate in France (7-8%) is a weakness to apply 
the social-democracy model of northern European countries.  This model cannot be 
transposed in a different context, different social relations history, and have the same 
consequences.  Few remember this. 
The agreement-signing-machine should take a break.  Dialogue is more important than 
bargaining. 
2. Germany : minimum wage... to demographic change 
 Debate on minimum wages 
The decline of the collective bargaining coverage rate has come along with an increase 
of the low-wage-sector. The share of employees whose hourly wages are less than 
two-thirds of the median-wage rose from 16.5 per cent  in 1994 to 22 per cent in 
2009 (Schäfer/Schmidt, 2012). Since 2008 the extent of the low-wage sector has, 
however, remained more or less constant. Nevertheless, trade unions have, more and 
more, called for statutory national minimum wage to combat the extension of the low-
wage-sector. After 5 weeks debating and bargaining, the conservative parties (CDU 
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and CSU) and the social democratic party (SPD) agreed on a “Grand Coalition” 
program that plans the introduction of statutory, universal minimum wage on january1, 
2017. 
The legislative framework allows three types of extensions of collective standards to 
other parties: 
 A first extension mechanism is laid down in the Collective Bargaining Act. On 
request of the social partners the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs can declare 
collective standards generally binding if two conditions hold. The bargaining parties 
have to represent a minimum of 50 per cent of all employees in the domain of the 
collective agreement. In addition, the extension must be deemed beneficial for the 
general public. Currently, only one per cent of all collective agreements are declared 
generally binding.  
 The second extension mechanism is based on the Posted Workers’ Act and is far 
more prevalent than the first one. In specified industries unions and employers’ 
associations are summoned to stipulate a minimum wage that is declared generally 
binding. While the former left-orientated-government was considering the extension 
of the provisions of the Posted Workers’ Act to all sectors in 2005, it is still restricted 
to some specific industries (i.e. 11 sectors). Currently, more than 4.5 million 
employees are working in sectors governed by a minimum wage. The extension of the 
collectively agreed minimum wage requires that at least 50 per cent of employees in 
this sector are covered by collective agreements. The Posted Workers’ Act even 
allows for the extensions even when a majority of the representatives of a bi-partite 
collective bargaining committee reject any measure (which has by now never 
occurred).    
 In general, the Minimum Working Conditions Act (Mindestarbeitsbedingungen-
gesetz) also allows for the provision of a minimum wage. A so-called steering 
committee may check whether wage and other working standards in a specific region 
or sector can cause severe social distortions. If the steering committee confirms the 
existence of distortions, the Ministry for Labour and Social Affairs sets up an expert 
committee that stipulates statutory minimum wages for the affected branches (Lesch, 
2010, 119.). However, this type of implementation has not been proceeded by now. 
 Destabilization of collective bargaining system 
The collective bargaining system is at risk of being destabilized by two drivers: 
 Bargaining coverage has continuously been declining over the last two decades (see 
above). In addition, collective standards set in sectoral agreement have been 
differentiated and decentralized via opening clauses.  
 Unions and union-affiliated researchers criticize that the decline and the 
decentralization process has come along with a high competitive pressure on low-wage 
groups (particularly in service industries) due a growing supply of low-skilled persons 
(Bispinck/Dribbusch/Schulten, 2010, 6). Furthermore, an imbalance of bargaining power 
in favour of the employers has evolved over the last years due to the growing 
significance of temporary agency work, fixed-term contracts and marginal part-time 
jobs.  
 Union landscape has become more fragmented. Over the last two decades, several 
professional associations have transformed into craft unions, which, nowadays, 
autonomously conclude collective agreements for their members. For specific 
employees in some industries sectoral-level agreements have been replaced by specific 
occupational-linked settlements. Thus, companies have to apply different collective 
standards simultaneously (partly for the same group of workers who are members of 
one of the two unions) and to face competition for members between the trade 
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unions (especially when two unions compete for the same potential membership 
group). This holds, for example, for the competition between United Service Sector 
Union (Verdi) and the craft union that represents flight attendants (Ufo) and the 
competition between Verdi and the craft union representing physicians employed in 
hospitals (Marburger Bund). By now, fragmentation has only occurred in the transport 
(railways, air traffic, air traffic-control) and health sectors.  
 In 2010, the federal labour court scrapped the, by then, governing principle that in 
the same company only one collective agreement could be in effect (Tarifeinheit). 
Employers’ associations are also concerned that further craft unions may be founded 
and the fragmentation of the union landscape continues to grow. Thus, the 
Confederation of German Employers’ Associations (BDA) and the DGB jointly 
requested legislative initiative to restore bargaining uniformity in 2010. While the 
government has, by now, not reacted to this request, the unions have, in the 
meantime, withdrawn their assistance to the formerly joint initiative. 
 Subjects primarily being discussed 
— Withdrawal of moderate wage policy  
After the economic crisis in 2008/09 the unions only partially continued their 
employment-orientated wage policy, which has taken place since the mid-1990s. While 
nominal unit labour costs did not increase between 2000 and 2008, they rose about 9 
per cent between 2009 und 2012. The rise was initially resulting from the 
implementation of short-time working schemes in 2009 and 2010. Thereafter, regular 
wage increases drove the rise of the unit labour costs. 
―  Wage dynamic, at least in some sectors, has partly been accelerated by the 
competition between unions that resulted in a race to the top. This applies 
particularly to situations when different types of workers who are organized by 
different unions are complementary – e.g. in the transport and health service sector. 
Union bargaining power rises as the likelihood of a stop of the entire production 
process by industrial action increases. Thus, employers have to negotiate with several 
unions one after another while the claim of the second-mover union is strongly 
influenced by the standards settled by the first-mover union. 
― Wage dynamic also reflects the improved state of the labour market. Unemployment 
has declined over the last years. Thus, unions can more strongly focus on wage 
increases without fearing substantial job losses. To combat the expansion of the low-
wage sector unions have not only called for a binding minimum wage, but have also 
regularly claimed disproportionally increases for low-wage workers. This applies 
particular for retail sector as well as for the hotel, restaurant and catering sector.  
— Temporary agency work 
As wages of temporary agency workers are, on average, lower that those of workers 
in the client companies, unions have striven for enforcing equal pay by political 
initiatives and reducing the pay gap by concluding additional wage agreements in some 
industries, such as the chemical industry, metal working and electrical industry, rail 
sector. The latter stipulate varying wage supplements for workers who are deployed 
to client companies for a specific duration. Wage supplements can total up to 50 per 
cent of the regular wage (IW, 2012a).   
Unions have, over the last years, claimed that works councils in the client companies 
should be empowered to block (or, at least, to restrain) the assignment of temporary 
agency workers. They, however, have, by now, failed to enforce their claim in the 
negotiation processes. 
  15 
— Demographic change 
The aging of the workforce along with the raise of the statutory retirement age entails 
that employees and companies deal with an extended working life. In addition, working 
age population is shrinking. Thus, companies have to attract and retain adequately 
skilled workers in order to maintain competitiveness. Thus issues, such as training or 
lifelong learning, health management, reconciliation of work and family life and smooth 
transition from work to retirement, have become more significant. This applies also to 
collective bargaining.  
Examples are as follows: 
 In the chemical industry, The Mining, Chemicals and Energy Industrial Union (IG 
BCE) and the employers’ association in the chemical industry (BAVC) concluded a new 
agreement on working life and demography (Tarifvertrag Lebensarbeitszeit und 
Demografie). It aims to smooth the transition from work to retirement and to retain 
older workers in the workforce. The agreement allows the employer and works 
council to conclude a works agreement which may stipulate the use of long-term 
working time accounts and progressive retirement, as well as partial retirement plans. 
Moreover, invalidity and regular pension plans based on the corresponding collective 
agreement may also be implemented by a works agreement. To provide for sufficient 
financial resources for these measures, from 1 January 2010 onwards, employers will 
be obliged to pay an annual €300 per employee into a company-specific ‘demography 
fund’ (Demographie-Fonds). From 2013 onwards, the payment is raised by further 
€200 per employee. This additional payment has to be strictly devoted to long-term 
working time accounts.  
 If no settlement is reached at company level, a ‘catch-all’ clause comes into effect. 
According to this clause, the fund must be used for the implementation of regular 
pension plans in companies employing up to 200 workers and for the implementation 
of long-term working time accounts in companies with a workforce of more than 200 
employees. The agreement in the chemicals industry is independent of any political 
decisions that may extend or abolish the current public subsidisation of progressive 
retirement plans.  
 The regional employers’ associations for the metal and electrical industry and the 
German Metalworkers’ Union (IG Metall) agreed on collective agreements on partial 
retirement, long-term working time accounts, and company-provided pension 
schemes.  
The agreements on partial retirement that took effect on 1 January 2010 regularly 
stipulate two schemes: 
― The first scheme sets out the general condition for partial retirement entitlement: 
employees aged 61 years or over who have worked at their company for at least 12 
years can benefit from partial retirement. The age threshold will be gradually raised in 
line with the statutory retirement age. These employees can retire partially for a 
maximum of four years, a period which must end at the earliest possible date on 
which these employees gain unrestricted access to their statutory pension. No 
compensation payments will be made by employers. The new agreement makes this 
provision available to a maximum of 2.5% of all employees in an establishment. 
― The second scheme lays down special regulations for employees who work under 
difficult conditions. Special entitlement to partial retirement is granted to employees 
who regularly worked three or more shifts – including night shifts or only night shifts 
– within the last nine years; worked rotating shifts for at least 12 years within the last 
15 years; worked under unfavourable environmental conditions – such as exposure 
to loud noise, or gas or dust. Furthermore, employees using their special entitlement 
have to be at least 57 years of age and must have worked for their company for at 
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least 12 years. They are allowed a maximum of six years in partial retirement, and 
this period can end before they gain access to their statutory pension scheme. In this 
case, employers will compensate them for their lost earnings at the rate of €250 a 
month for a maximum of 24 months. 
It should be noted that up to 2.5% of the staff in a given establishment can take 
advantage of the aforementioned special partial retirement scheme. However, the total 
number of employees taking up their general or special entitlement to retire early 
must not exceed the 4% threshold. Moreover, the agreement stipulates special 
regulations if quotas for general and special entitlement are exploited at the 
establishment level. Employees in partial retirement will receive 85% to 89% of their 
former net income. Additionally, contributions to the statutory pension scheme will be 
paid on 95% of employees’ former income. 
The collective agreement on additional company-provided pension payment came 
already into effect in 2006.   
 Since 2011, employees at Deutsche Post have been eligible to transform wage 
components, such as bonuses, into a long-term working time account credit. The 
provisions of the firm-agreement allow those aged 59 and above to vote for an early 
retirement or a partial retirement scheme. In addition, the provisions of a 
complementing firm-agreement are supposed to reduce physical burden and the 
workload of older employees to extend working life until reaching the statutory 
retirement age.   
— Adjustment of framework agreements   
Several sectors are characterised by ambitions to align the provisions of the 
framework agreement with the challenges and consequences arising from 
demographic, structural, and technical change. This holds particularly for working time 
arrangements and wage structures which have already been overhauled in the chemical 
industry, in the metalworking and electrical industry (see for details Stettes, 2005), and 
public administration/services. Negotiations in the retail sector on the modernisation 
of the framework agreement that had governed working conditions since 1950 were 
launched in 2002 in particular to deal with liberalisation of opening hours. They were, 
however, suspended by Ver.di in 2012 which induced the employers’ association in 
retail to terminate all settlements.  Likewise, negotiations in the printing industry which 
were held between 2003 and 2005 as well as in 2011 failed to reach an adapted 
agreement and came along with industrial action. 
 Collective bargaining in the field of competitiveness and 
employment   
Regular or implicit concession bargaining at the firm-level – that means wages, working 
time, other working conditions and the employment level or investments are 
simultaneously dealt with – are often called (company-level) alliances for jobs. 
Typically, the management guarantees the survival of jobs or sites in exchange to wage 
concessions and/or the increase or flexibilisation of working time. 
Representative data is still missing, but two periods of concession bargaining can be 
differentiated: 
 Prior to 2003/2004, company-level alliances for jobs or deviations from collective 
standard (even when jointly decided by the works council and the management) were 
often at risk of violating the legislation on collective bargaining as regular opening 
clauses were less prevalent than nowadays. In those days, derogations of collective 
standards initiated by the management unilaterally or jointly with the works councils or 
staff were often not authorised by unions and employers’ associations.  
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 Non-representative empirical evidence suggests that the proportion of 
establishment or companies implementing alliances for jobs totalled between 23 per 
cent and 40 per cent depending on the sector analysed (Massa-Wirth/Seifert, 2004; 
Berthold et al., 2003a and 2003b). 
 From 2004/2005 onwards, opening clauses have, more and more, added to sectoral 
collective agreements. The most significant one is the settlement in the metalworking 
and electrical industry – the so-called Pforzheimer Abkommen – that has, since coming 
into effect in 2004, allowed companies to temporarily derogate from sectoral 
standards so that the competitiveness of the company can be improved, innovation can 
be fostered and investment can be spurred. Contrary to the provisions of the few 
opening clauses established prior to 2004/2005 deviating in the metal and working 
industries does not necessarily require the firm to be in economic turmoil.  
 Ellguth et al. (2012) provide some evidence on the adoption of opening clauses 
between 2005 and 2007. They found that collective agreements including opening 
clauses applied to one third of the surveyed establishments, 33 per cent of which 
actually adopted the clause.  
In both periods, empirical evidence suggests that works councils play a significant role 
in concluding alliances for jobs at the firm-level. According to Ellguth et al. (2012, 11) 
making use of opening clauses is more widespread in establishments with works 
councils (39 per cent) than in establishments without works councils (21 per cent). 
According to Berthold et al. (2003a and 2003b), due to their information and 
enforceable codetermination rights works councils can facilitate the conclusion of 
alliances for jobs particularly if the labour relations at the establishment level is 
characterised by a lack of trust. In addition, empirical evidence shows that works 
councils generally prefer changes in working time to wage reductions unless the 
economic situation is too severe (Berthold et al., 2003b; Massa-Wirth/Seifert, 2005). If 
wage concessions cannot be avoided due to the imbalanced stage of business, the 
management and workers’ representatives usually decide to suspend regularly 
stipulated wage increases, cut (holiday or Christmas) bonuses and/or abolish other 
perks.  
Prior to 2004/2005 the proportion of establishments that laid down the results of the 
concession talks in a bilaterally signed document is estimated to fluctuate between one 
quarter and more than two thirds. However, making use of opening clauses provided 
by collective agreements regularly requires the conclusion of an additional agreement, 
in several sectors such as the metalworking and electrical industry also signed by the 
union and employers’ association and/or a works agreement between management and 
works council. 
3. Italy: Fiat.. and then what? 
An important recent development in the Italian collective bargaining system is the 
national agreement on representation and representativeness for national industry-
wide agreements signed on 31st May 2013 by the president of the employers’ 
organization Confindustria and the leaders of the three major trade union 
confederations. This intersectoral agreement marks the end of a decade of division 
among the three most important union confederations in Italy started with the refusal 
by the Cgil to sign the agreements of 2002 and 2009, and represents an important step 
towards regulating representation and collective bargaining in Italy. The deal includes 
important details for the measurement and represents an advancements towards the 
decentralization by explicating the criteria for making company-level bargaining 
generally binding for all the organizations belonging to the signatory parties (Pedersini, 
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2013b). With the new deal, RSU elections will be proportional and  the rule that used 
to save three seats for the three signing unions is abolished. Moreover, in order to 
take part in the negotiations for the national collective agreement, the federations of 
the signing union organizations need a level of certified representativeness no lower 
than 5 per cent, abolishing the previous rule in the Statute of Workers (Article 19), 
which allowed some businesses to sign agreements with minority unions (Mura, 
2013a). 
Another important trend in collective bargaining in Italy is the increasing attention and 
implementation of company level agreements. According to Ocsel (2012), the subject 
primarily being discussed in collective bargaining still remains wage policy (discussed in 
the 48% of the company agreements) but, as a consequence of the economic and 
financial crisis about the 28% of company agreements are taking into account measures 
related to crisis and restructuration management. Wage policies are discussed mainly 
in the manufacturing sector (about 26%), public sector (16%) and chemical sector 
(14%), and usually concerns the bargaining of the variable wage component especially 
in those companies that are experiencing better economical performances. In the last 
years the company level bargaining is also assuming a defensive role, trying to control 
redundancies and helping workers made redundant. Most of these agreements, in fact, 
concern wage guarantee fund to protections and employment stability. 22% of 
company agreements regard trade union rights, mainly union representation structure 
and the right to assembly, and working time. The latter topic has major importance 
not only at the level of collective bargaining but also at the decentralized level and 
concerns mainly flexibility issues (51%), working time distribution (32%), part‐time 
(29%) and overtime (22%). Even if less frequent than in the past due to financial 
cutbacks, internal welfare is a subject in 18% of the company agreements especially in 
the manufacturing (20%) and construction (12%) sectors. The main issues regarding 
internal welfare involve services and agreements (78%) like incentives, concierge 
service and on-site childcare; supplementary pension, insurance and health schemas 
(63%) and improvement to statutory requirements (53%) as additional maternity and 
parental leave.  
In this context, it is particularly interesting analysing the biggest car manufacturer, Fiat, 
break-away from employers’ Confederation of Italian Industry (Confindustria) and the 
new group-level agreement that is upsetting the traditional Italian industrial relations 
systems. 
Moreover, the globalized competitive dynamics are generating new needs in terms of 
flexibility and reshaping the collective bargaining system. Some trends are for example 
the ever increasing decentralization of collective bargaining but also challenges related 
to restructuration processes and outsourcing processes – as in the case of Vodafone 
Italy - that often involved the relocation of manufacturing and services in other 
countries. The economical and financial crisis in fact, has had a strong impact on the 
Italian industrial relations and can has forced to take important autonomous initiatives. 
Italy is facing a great challenge that goes through a transformation of the traditional 
industrial relations system in order to reach not only more flexibility but also an 
evolution towards more cooperative relationships between social actors. After a long 
period of divisions and conflicts, the most important Italian trade unions have recently 
started again to move in the same direction and to cooperate in order to reach a 
more positive relationships with employers and managers. These actors are becoming 
increasingly aware that cooperative labour relations and managerial initiative are not in 
competition but can coexist. 
Anyway, not exactly in this direction are going the last decisions undertaken by the 
Fiat’s management team that, on one side, are emphasizing the decentralization of 
bargaining at the company level but, on the other side, are defining a new framework 
  19 
of industrial relations that resizes the role of trade unions and employer associations in 
the bargaining structure. 
Another important actor in this picture is the financial crisis. Challenges posed by 
restructuration processes as well as redundancy needs require once again a process of 
triangulation between management, unions and local or central institutions in order to 
protect employment security and stability. Within this issue, the process of relocation 
of manufacturing and service activities in emerging countries has a large impact on 
employment and is concerning the public opinion due to the risk that many companies 
may leave because of the environment uncertainty and lack of political plans aimed at 
creating the conditions necessary to revitalize the economic system and improving 
competitiveness. 
Moreover, budget constraints at the governmental level are encouraging associations 
of employers, trade unions, foundations and non-profit organizations to find new ways 
to cope with the needs created by reduced public welfare provision. This sort of 
“second welfare” is a way to offer the same benefits that often enjoy employees of 
larger organizations also to those people working in SMEs, in a context in which 
industrial relations are gradually changing in response to the growing demands for 
workers’ welfare protection 
 Subjects primarily being discussed 
A critical issue in collective bargaining in Italy is working time and flexibility. On 
average the collectively agreed weekly working time is 38 hours. Part-time agreements 
are traditionally few implemented and the part-time employment rate is in general 
quite low (17% - Eurostat) penalizing especially female employment. On the other side, 
it’s increasing the amount of involuntary part time workers, those who work part-time 
because have not found a full-time job. Before the crisis they were about the 40 per 
cent of employed part-time while now represent more than half of them (CNEL, 
2012). Moreover, the average number of actual weekly hours of work reveals that 
Italian workers spend on average 36.3 hours at work (Eurostat, LFS). 
This context requires also new models of collective bargaining – more managerial and 
advanced – and new subjects need to be discussed as in the case of “Treviso’s 
agreement”.  
4. United Kingdom: limited collective bargaining 
Collective bargaining coverage in the UK is relatively low, as noted above, and the 
coverage rate is falling. Coverage in the private sector is particularly low, and for trade 
unions, this represents certainly one of the main challenges in relation to industrial 
relations.  
Another trend and challenge for trade unions is falling trade union membership. 
According to WERS 2011, the percentage of workplaces with any union members fell 
by six percentage points, from 29% in 2004 to 23% in 2011. The percentage in which a 
majority of workers were union members fell from 14% to 10%.  
Recognition by employers of trade unions for negotiating terms and conditions of 
employment also fell, although not so sharply – the percentage of workplaces with 
recognised trade unions fell from 24% in 2004 to 21% in 2011.  
The main challenge of the past five years, for both employers and employees, has been 
coping with the effects of the economic crisis in Europe. For employers, the main 
concern has been to continue to operate effectively in times of reduced demand and 
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reduced consumer spending power. Cutting labour costs and minimising increases in 
labour spending have therefore been strategies adopted by many employers.  
The number of days lost to industrial action was very high in 2011 (1,380,000, 
compared with 563,000 the previous year), giving rise to media reports that industrial 
action was becoming increasingly common in the UK. However, a Chartered Institute 
of Personnel and Development (CIPD) report released at the end of 2012 claims that 
90% of those days lost were due to a single national day of action that took place in 
November 2011, and that the long-term trend is towards declining industrial action. 
Further, the CIPD notes that over 90% of days lost to industrial action have been in 
the public sector. The study included only a few employers affected by industrial 
action, and those that were affected did not view it as a serious problem (Gamwell, 
2012). The CIPD report also found that there was a range of alternatives to strike 
action, such as trade unions balloting on strike action, but not actually taking action. 
Other alternatives to strike action include street demonstrations, consumer 
campaigning and boycotts of global brands in order to protest against employment 
conditions within the supply chain.  
 Subjects primarily being discussed 
— Engaging with the recession 
Employers have been adopting a range of cost-cutting strategies to try to cope with 
the ongoing economic downturn. Where unions or employee representatives are 
present, these will be negotiated. If no employee or trade union representatives are 
present, the employer is likely to put them into place by unilateral decision. The latest 
WERS study (WERS 2011) found that 33% of employees reported a cut or freeze in 
pay as a result of the recession, with  19% reporting restrictions on access to paid 
overtime, and 6% a reduction in non-wage benefits. Other impacts reported by WERS 
2011 respondents included an increase in workload (29%), work reorganisation (19%), 
and restrictions on access to training (12%).  
The above-mentioned CIPD study also looks at the way in which employers and 
employees are engaging in the context of the recession. It finds that where collective 
mechanisms are in place, employers are using them, although this is taking place in the 
context of a general trend towards lower collective bargaining coverage and therefore 
increasing direct communication with employees (see above). 
Overall, then, it would seem that in the UK, employers have been having to deal with 
the consequences of the recession (over three-quarters of the WERS 2011 
respondents had taken some kind of action that had had a direct impact on their 
workforce, in response to the recession). However, as reported above, this seems to 
be mainly focused on pay cuts and freezes. Employees have not been widely 
experiencing cuts in working time – only 5% of employees in the WERS study reported 
having to reduce their contractual working hours. This is in contrast to the strategy of 
short-time working adopted in many other EU Member States, such as Germany and 
Italy, where state subsidy is available to enable employers to reduce working time for 
employees rather than make redundancies. Although some employers in the UK have 
tried to do this, recognising that it is costly to re-recruit once the economy picks up, 
the fact that no state subsidies are available has limited this practice.  
— Flexible working 
Flexible working is a popular way of increasing employee commitment and loyalty, 
which in turn decreases employee turnover and recruitment coast. Flexible working 
can also have positive benefits for the employer’s business in terms of increasing the 
flexibility of production or services.  A great number of larger companies now offer a 
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wide range of alternative working patterns and extend the right to request flexible 
working to all employees – there is currently a legal obligation for an employer to 
consider (although not grant) a request for flexible working from workers with 
children under the age of 16 (or 18 in the case of children with disabilities).  
There seems to be evidence that the practice of flexible working is growing in the UK. 
According to the 2011 annual survey on employment trends from the CBI and 
recruitment specialists Harvey Nash, almost all of the employers (96 per cent) that 
responded to the survey offered at least one form of flexible work, and 70 per cent 
had three or more types available to staff. In particular, the survey found that there has 
been particularly rapid expansion in recent years in the use of teleworking and the 
provision of career breaks/sabbaticals. Another key finding of this was that the 
increased use of flexible working looks set to continue in the next few years, as many 
employers said they were currently considering introducing additional flexible working 
arrangements. Further, the survey acknowledges the role that the recession has played 
in this trend: “Since 2008, responses to the recession have included more widespread 
adoption of two forms of flexible working: nearly half of employers (46%) participating 
in the survey now offer career breaks and/or sabbaticals. Many firms introduced these 
as a way to reduce labour costs and cut staffing on a temporary basis during the 
recession but – realising that employees value them – have opted to retain them” 
(CBI/Harvey Nash 2013, p.34). Other popular forms of flexible working include flexi-
time, term-time working, job-sharing, annualised hours, compressed hour and 
teleworking. 
— Zero hours contract 
One of the main areas of flexibility in UK employment relations recently has been an 
increase in the practice of concluding so-called zero hours contracts (whereby 
employers hire workers but do not specify any working hours, calling them in to work 
just when they are needed). This has been the focus of debate in the UK in the past 
few weeks, as recent figures show that there has been an increase in the conclusion of 
these types of contracts. According to a report released in June 2013 (Resolution 
Foundation, 2013), based on data from the UK Office for National Statistics, the 
number of people employed on zero hours contracts rose from 134,000 in 2006 (0.5 
per cent of the workforce) to 208,000 (0.7 per cent) in 2012. Zero hours contracts 
are held by a large proportion of young people – 37% of those on such contracts are 
aged between 16 and 24. The report estimates that 8 per cent of workplaces across a 
wide range of sectors use zero hours contracts. Specifically, 20 per cent of those 
employed on zero-hours contracts work in health and social work, 19 per cent in 
hospitality, 12 per cent in administration, 11 per cent in retail and 8 per cent in arts, 
entertainment and leisure. The report notes that this form of contracting has become 
popular in the UK in times of recession, as a way for the employer to cut costs and 
reduce risk: “It is not hard to see why zero-hours contracts can appear attractive to 
employers. They allow for maximum flexibility to meet changing demand. They can 
facilitate the management of risk, reduce the costs of recruitment and training, and 
they can, in certain circumstances, enable employers to avoid particular employment 
obligations” (Resolution Foundation 2013, p.4. However, the report also notes that 
zero hours contracts can have significant disadvantages for employees in that they do 
not guarantee regular, or indeed any, hours of work and therefore income. This also 
makes planning difficult for those with financial or other responsibilities. 
Trade unions are keen to tighten up regulation on zero hours contracts in order to 
protect workers. The UK government is currently looking at the issue.  
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— Involvement of worker representatives 
Worker representatives must, by law, be informed and consulted in certain 
circumstances, such as if the employer wishes to make collective redundancies or 
engage in a business transfer. In contrast to many other European countries, there is 
no general practice of setting up works councils in companies, and the 2002 EU 
Directive on information and consultation of employees does not really seem to have 
changed the situation in the UK. WERS 2011 estimates that there are joint consultative 
committees in only 6% of UK workplaces. Where works council-type bodies or 
European Works Councils exist, however, employee representatives will typically 
receive some kind of training, either through a trade union or organised by the 
employer. Despite this lack of formal structures, the UK is characterised as a country 
in which there is relatively high involvement and influence of employees over 
organisational decisions (Eurofound 2013).  
Further, employee participation is relatively widespread in the UK. The Involvement 
and Participation Association (IPA), which promotes employee engagement, 
involvement and information and consultation, defines employee participation as a 
process whereby there is joint commitment, from employees and the employer, to the 
success of the organisation, joint recognition of the other party’s legitimate interests, 
joint commitment to employment security, joint focus on the quality of working life, 
joint commitment to operating in a transparent manner, and joint commitment to add 
value to the arrangement3. 
 Collective bargaining in the field of competitiveness and 
employment   
There does not seem to be a great deal of data regarding collective bargaining and 
competitiveness. Trade unions are focusing their campaigning at present on trying to 
secure pay increases for public sector workers after a two-year pay freeze (public 
sector workers will receive a pay increase this year), and encouraging employers to 
increase pay in the private sector. Trade unions are also concerned that the economic 
crisis is having more far-reaching effects on the workforce, in areas such as health, 
wellbeing, bullying and harassment, heavy workloads and rising stress levels.  
There is a wide range of bargaining activity taking place that aims to increase 
competitiveness and employee engagement. Where trade unions are present, 
companies will engage with them in order to create new arrangements and new ways 
of working. Where trade unions are not present, which is mostly the case in the 
private sector, companies will often put into place arrangements after overall 
consultation with the workforce.  
The above-mentioned CIPD report examines recent trends in employment relations 
and collective bargaining in some detail, based on interviews with senior HR 
professionals across the country. It concludes that there are no particularly new 
trends, although there is a shift of focus during the recession, towards issues such as 
workplace culture, consultation of employees rather than negotiation, and a need to 
motivate employees: “The research suggests that the challenges most senior HR 
professionals and ER specialists are facing today are recognisably similar to those they 
were facing five or even ten years ago. Where pressures have increased, this often 
feels to those directly involved in managing them to be more a continuation of long-
term trends than the result of a one-off disturbance. Nevertheless the background is 
one of relentless commercial and financial pressures, and the focus of attention 
                                               
3 IPA website: http://www.ipa-involve.com/partnership-in-the-workplace/ 
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continues to shift – from machinery to culture, from negotiation to consultation, from 
pay to motivation and from collective to individual relationships” (CIPD 2012 p.2). 
In terms of the subject matter of bargaining or employment relations, the CIPD notes 
that employers are finding it harder to use pay as an incentive, as it is difficult to 
increase pay during these economically challenging times. Therefore, employers are 
having to look elsewhere to motivate and engage employees. The main concern for 
employers seems to be ensuring that they have flexibility to adjust working patterns or 
employment conditions to reflect changing commercial realities. Having said this, some 
organisations, such as those operating in the health sector, are finding that they need 
to cut back on flexible working patterns, according to the CIPD report: “In recent 
years our financial situation has become increasingly challenging with pressure for 
more efficiency savings. This has forced us to review our flexible working 
arrangements. In the early years we were able to accommodate a high degree of 
flexibility and gave line managers discretion to agree individual working patterns with 
staff to meet disability, caring, childcare and other needs. However, the resulting 
working ‘restrictions’ took up a significant amount of scheduling time and were 
affecting the efficiency of the trust. Around half of staff had their own individualised 
working arrangements, within a shift structure supporting a service that had to be 
delivered 24/7”. HR interviewee from NHS Direct (CIPD 2012 p.13). 
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3. 9 businesses, 9 economic realities,  
9 new approaches to negotiations  
on businesses' competitiveness 
There are few similarities between the British situation where the company is not under the 
obligation to negotiate working time arrangements but has a lot of room for manoeuvre to 
do unilateral adjustments and the German model built on a strong tradition of social 
partnership where the social partners supervise and control adjustment possibilities at 
sectoral level. 
Likewise, there are no similarities between Italy where collective agreement prevails over the 
law and where the social partners’ independence is a principle, and the French legalist 
tradition that is constantly emphasizing the issue of the link between the law and contact, 
with the will to give more weight to the latter, without really succeeding. 
In this context, it doesn’t come as a surprise that recent changes to collective bargaining in 
these countries didn’t follow the same paths.  However, analysing these 9 cases can at least 
prove one thing: in these countries, and probably everywhere in Europe, economic and social 
changes are blurring the lines, regardless of the room taken by collective bargaining in 
industrial relations. 
1. The French auto industry:  
looking for better competitiveness 
 Renault: shared understanding of the company’s stakes with the 
social partners 
With the crisis that has led to a drop in car sales and a loss of markets, Renault’s 
management and unions have worked, on the one hand, on the necessary reduction of 
production costs to improve the competitiveness of French businesses and, on the 
other, on maintaining jobs. 
Renault’s management committed to maintain 71,000 vehicles in France, maintaining its 
industrial sites and engineering operations, which represents the heart of Renault’s 
trade. 
To that end, Renault committed not to appeal to a social plan but it won’t replace 
positions by 2016, and then to recruit 760 people for critical skills.  In return, 
employees accepted, among other things, annual working time (35-hour week in 
average) whereas calculation is currently weekly and, for some workers, below 35 
hours. 
A pay freeze is also planned for 2013/14/15 but profit-sharing will be increased in 
return. 
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This agreement is one of the first negotiated and probably the one whose scope and 
impact will be most observed. 
Please not that a new way of bargaining was approved: sharing the stakes of the 
negotiation in advance with the trade unions and taking the time to develop a shared, 
joint diagnosis. 
Will this recent agreement (April 2013) serve as a model in an uncertain economic 
environment?  PSA also signed a competitiveness agreement in October 2013. 
Since the law of June 13, 2013 provided the legal framework, a lot of agreements have 
been signed, especially in the metal industry, following the German example. 
2. The German metal industry,  
in the vanguard of competitiveness agreements 
 Assessment made by German metal employers 
Earlier (see p.16), we have seen that decentralization in Germany mainly took place via 
the opening clauses negotiated in the sectoral agreements.  These clauses allow 
businesses, under some circumstances, to derogate from the provisions contained in 
the collective agreement, sometimes allowing them to deeply change the organization 
of working time. It is also the sectoral collective agreement in the metal industry that 
allowed reshaping the pay structure to tie a greater share of pay to productivity.  To 
report on these negotiations, which helped businesses adjust to the new economic 
deal, we interviewed, on June 18, 2013, Karsten Tacke, Vice Director of Gesamtmetall, 
the umbrella organization of the employers’ associations in the metalworking and 
electrical industry. Facing the large union federation in the sector – IG Metall –
,Gesamtmetall, was the other player of the framework agreements negotiated at 
sectoral level, allowing to develop company agreements adapted to their economic 
realities and obligations. Founded in 1890, the association represents the common 
interests shared by Germany’s largest industrial sector. Gesamtmetall aims to improve 
industrial relations and working conditions, and thus the performance of the German 
M+E industry. This is crucial for creating and securing competitive jobs in Germany. 
Gesamtmetall speaks for 22 member associations representing 6,300 companies and 
2.1 million employees. Most member companies use the collective bargaining 
mechanism, others do not. Negotiating party is IG Metall.  
Regarding the adoption of opening clauses, the involvement of the employers‘ 
associations is deemed crucial for the efficient adoption of opening clauses by the 
companies. As the social partners were, in 2002/2003, confronted with the threat of 
statutory opening clause to be established, they decided that the derogation of 
collective standards requires the joint approval by the union and employers’ 
association (Pforzheimer Abkommen). This settlement is, thus, notably in contrast to 
those with opening clauses that grant the management and the works council total 
autonomy if some conditions hold. According to Mr Tacke, collective bargaining in the 
metalworking and electrical industry has been stabilized by the provisions of the 
“Pforzheimer” agreement and the acceptance of sectoral provisions has been raised. In 
addition, it has increased the awareness of the social partners for the specific 
challenges and needs of the individual companies. In this respect, collective bargaining 
at the sectoral level has become more efficient and more effective.  
About the flexible working time, besides wages, working time arrangements are 
deemed the most significant issue in collective bargaining and both employee 
representatives and employers perceive need to action. According to Mr Tacke, 
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flexible working time is the logical consequence of the reduction in working time 
which the union enforced by industrial action in 1984. A 35-hour working in western 
Germany (38 hours in eastern Germany) are only feasible in globalised markets if 
working hours can be deployed flexibly. While the employers currently focus on 
increasing flexibility to overcome a looming shortage if skilled labour, IG Metall is 
striving for more autonomy of the employees to balance work and family life more 
effectively.  
About overhauling the framework agreement on wages, from the employers’ point of 
view, the modernised framework agreement on wages (called 
Entgeltrahmenabkommen, ERA) is, with regard to sectoral agreements, said to be 
state-of-the-art. Tasks and the corresponding pay scheme are completely overhauled, 
the distinction between blue-collar and white-collar employees abolished. Likewise the 
moderate wage policy and the Pforzheimer settlement, the revised framework 
agreement has also raised the acceptance of the collective bargaining system among 
the companies. Thus, the various regional employers‘ associations in the metalworking 
and electrical industry have intensively promoted the adoption of the new pay scheme 
as well as have given advice and support to the companies during the implementation 
process. According to Mr Tacke, the affected establishments have very much 
appreciated the services provided by the employers‘ associations. Furthermore, ERA 
has become an attractive reference for non-member firms many of which have 
adopted the standards. 
 Assessing industrial relations in the metal and electrical 
industry 
Industrial action occurs occasionally in contrast to the chemical industry, but IG Metall, 
the regional employers‘ associations, and Gesamtmetall have, particularly over the last 
decade, cultivated an atmosphere that have promoted the finding of appropriate 
solutions in a timely manner. Despite bargaining rounds in the sector have mainly been 
dominated by wage issues – i.e. affecting distribution – social partners have learnt to 
find mutually acceptable solutions even if the latter sometimes mean to forego its 
demands. According to Mr Tacke, in this respect collective bargaining in the 
metalworking and electrical industry notably differ from that in other sectors, such as 
the service industries.  
Conflicts in the service industries partly caused by inter-union competition are said to 
jeopardise the collective bargaining system in Germany. Thus, Gesamtmetall calls for 
legal intervention to ensure the principle of one company, one agreement and to 
restore bargaining uniformity. This holds even if crafts unions have not expanded their 
ambitions and activities to the metalworking and electrical industry. Nonetheless, it is 
feared that specific occupations might form coalitions besides IG Metall resulting in 
undermining the peace-keeping character of the sectoral agreement. In addition, 
Gesamtmetall expects that, in this case, IG Metall’s wage policy would become more 
aggressive resulting in more strikes and/or larger wage increases both jeopardising the 
competitiveness of the member firms. Finally, the employers’ also assume that fairness 
and equity between various staff groups would vanish. 
individual employers to take advantage of cost savings, facilities and services that would 
normally only be available to large firms, and to distribute contract management costs 
among a wider number of recipients (Maino & Mallone, 2012). 
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3. Preparing businesses for the planned liberalization of 
their sector: the Deutsche Bahn's example 
To study this case, we have interviewed Werner Bayreuther, Director of AGV MoVe 
that represents companies in the rail sector most of which are affiliated to Deutsche 
Bahn. It was held on 25 June 2013.The Employers’ Associations of Transportation 
Companies (Arbeitgeberverband der Mobilitäts- und Verkehrsdienstleister, AGV 
MoVe) represents around 70 companies operating in transportation, constructing and 
maintaining the infrastructure in the railway sector as well as providing services for the 
former that are affiliated to Deutsche Bahn. The AGV MoVe reports a total of about 
180,000 employees working in its member companies. Negotiation parties are the 
Railway and Transport Union (Eisenbahn- und Verkehrsgewerkschaft, EVG) and the 
German Engine Drivers’ Union (Gewerkschaft Deutscher Lokomotivführer, GDL).  
 DB, a German company unlike any other 
The most important issues currently are the deregulation and decentralisation of 
collective standards. Via opening clauses authority to define standards are supposed to 
be delegated to the partners at the establishment-level. Thus, collective bargaining 
issues are to be better aligned with codetermination issues. Due to the evolution of 
Deutsche Bahn – from a former state-run business to a privatised though state-owned 
company – collective bargaining actors and procedures still do not match with 
codetermination actors (works councils) and procedures to cope effectively with 
current and future challenges in an international, liberalised transport market. At least, 
the decentralisation of collective standards concerning measures dealing with 
demographic change (s. Collective agreement on dealing with the demographic change 
– see below) was partly successful.  
From the AGV-MoVe’s point of view, increased decentralisation is deemed necessary 
concerning agreements on wages and working time in the various divisions (long-
distance transport, local transport, rail cargo, railway infrastructure and rail-affiliated 
services) as well as for employees with specific tasks (train operation, train 
deployment, repair and maintenance, engine drivers, service operator, administration). 
The collective agreement on wages and working time for engine drivers was concluded 
with the GdL though engine drivers are organised both by GdL and EVG.  
Over the last decade employment at Deutsche Bahn and its affiliates has been the most 
relevant issue. In 2005, a specific collective agreement was concluded that aimed at 
safeguarding jobs. The settlement expired in 2011 and its provisions were subsequently 
transferred into the collective agreement on overcoming the challenges arising from 
demographic change. Though the agreement currently applies only to EVG-members 
while the negotiations with GdL are still on hold, the domain of the collective 
standards has increased. 
 Collective agreement on dealing with the demographic change 
Qualitative issues of collective bargaining are predominantly governed by the relatively 
new collective agreement on dealing with demographic change which was concluded 
only with EVG. This settlement includes several elements which pertain to a life-cycle-
orientated human resource management approach, such as lifelong training and 
learning, a job guarantee for young workers who have finished their apprenticeship as 
well as for ageing workers, measures to balance work and family life more effectively 
and schedules allowing a smooth transition from work to retirement.  
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Since April 2013, Deutsche Bahn provides a budget totalling 25 million euro per year 
for funding partial retirement (including part-time work in kind of a four-day-week) in 
the latest stage of the career. The fund is available only for workers aged 60 and above 
who have minimum tenure of 20 years and have been exposed to specific burdens, 
such as shift work. Beneficiaries receive a payment that equals 87.5 per cent of their 
former salary. Deutsche Bahn estimates that, on average, around 10,000 employees 
can refer to the scheme over the next five years. If the fund is not completely 
exploited the remaining amount will be devoted to financing long-term working time 
accounts. Thus the programme does not only favour older workers, but also younger 
employees. In addition, the flexibility of the company in designing life-cycle-orientated 
HR practices is increased. 
— Collective agreements on raising competitiveness 
Due to the liberalization of the rail system tenders for local and regional lines and 
routes have to be invited for since 1994. As formerly state-run monopolist Deutsche 
Bahn has had to enter the tender procedures exhibiting a disadvantage with respect to 
labour costs. Thus, Deutsche Bahn had, by 2010, aspired to lower labour costs by 15 
per cent to remain competitive. As the unions heavily opposed this goal, Deutsche 
Bahn and the unions jointly accepted that the wage surplus in relation to the 
competitors should be capped at 5 per cent.  
The EVG called for a comprehensive collective agreement covering all local and 
regional routes irrespective of the operating company that stipulates provisions 
comparable to those already existing for the DB-affiliate DB-Regio. EVG’s aim was to 
eliminate any wage competition. In 2011, negotiations with Deutsche Bahn and its six 
largest competitors came eventually to the end after being accompanied with industrial 
action and arbitration. The agreement stipulates that the competitors may only 
undercut the DB-Regio-collective standards in open tender by 6.25 per cent at the 
maximum. The difference is somewhat larger concerning engine drivers as GdL has 
been able to conclude only a few firm-agreements with competitors of Deutsche Bahn. 
— Assessment of industrial relations in the rail sector 
Due to inter-union competition and consecutive bargaining rounds with different 
unions negotiations have become more difficult. According to Deutsche Bahn 
atmosphere has significantly deteriorated because the various unions try to gain as 
much as they can even at the cost of other unions and their members. A rather typical 
feature is the withdrawal of GdL from the joint negotiations between Deutsche Bahn, 
EVG and GdL on the measures dealing with the challenges arising from demographic 
change in April 2012. GdL strove to reach better provisions for engine drivers than 
those which could be expected in joint negotiations.  
Furthermore, rivalry between the unions is further spurred by rivalry between the 
works councils which may foster or hamper the implementation of the collective 
provisions at the establishments. In addition, the aggressive member-orientated GdL-
bargaining policy has forced EVG to become more conflict-orientated. EVG is 
compelled to prove their ability to enforce their interests by calling on warning strikes 
more frequently.   
Deutsche Bahn expects a major industrial conflict in 2014 when the ruling framework 
agreements will expire and GdL is allowed to negotiate also on behalf on members 
that are not engine drivers.  GdL already announced to claim the power of attorney 
for rail attendants who are currently represented by EVG. In return, EVG already 
announced to bargain a settlement for engine drivers who are members of EVG.  
Thus, AGV MoVe and Deutsche Bahn call for a legal framework that governs inter-
union competition and its consequences. Likewise Gesamtmetall, they aim at ensuring 
  29 
the principle of one company, one agreement and at restoring bargaining uniformity. 
Statutory provisions to regulate industrial action are deemed ineffective as the courts 
have, by now, failed to find effective and efficient procedures. 
4. Fiat, or how to build an industrial relations 
framework inclined to change 
The recent developments of industrial relations in Fiat, characterized by the company 
exit from the country's largest industrial group Confindustria, combine both the issue 
of the general trend towards decentralization of bargaining and of the ways of trade 
union representation at company level, defining a new framework of industrial 
relations that is very different from the traditional bargaining structure. 
In June 2010 Fiat signed an agreement at its plant in Pomigliano, but the Italian 
Federation of Metalworkers (Fiom), affiliated to the General Confederation of Italian 
Workers (Cgil), refused to sign it undermining the success of its implementation. 
In December of the same year, with the Mirafiori agreement the company chose a new 
strategy, creating a new company for each plant and negotiating a new first-level 
company agreement thereby abandoning the metalworking industry-wide agreement 
and the practice of second-level supplementary collective agreements at company and 
plant levels.  
Fiat decided not to take advantage of the agreement signed in September 2010 by two 
of the three major sectoral trade union federations and Federmeccanica, the 
metalworking employers’ association affiliated at Confindustria which included the 
opportunity to introduce opening clauses at decentralised level. The company refused 
also to support the attempt to create a sub-sectoral agreement for the auto industry 
promoted by Federmeccanica and decided, at the end of 2011, to abandon the 
Confindustria’s representation system and the multi-employer bargaining system. 
At the end of September 2011, the CEO of Fiat S.p.A. and Chairman of Fiat Industrial 
S.p.A., Sergio  
Marchionne, sent a letter to the President of Confindustria, Emma Marcegaglia, 
explaining the reasons of his decision. 
 
THE LETTER FROM MARCHIONNE TO MARCEGAGLIA 
Dear Emma,  
In recent months, after years of inaction, two important decisions were taken in this 
country with the objective of creating the conditions necessary to revitalize our 
economic system.  
I am referring to the interconfederate agreement signed by national trade unions on 
June 28th 
and promoted by Confindustria, and, even more important, the passing of Article 8 
by Parliament that provides essential mechanisms for labour flexibility, in addition to 
extending the validity of the June 28th agreement to agreements reached prior to 
that date.  
Fiat was immediate in expressing its unreserved appreciation to the government, 
Confindustria  
and trade unions for the two provisions that would resolve many sticking points in 
relations with the trade unions and provide the certainties necessary to this 
nation’s economic development.  
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At a particularly difficult time for the global economy, this new framework would 
have enabled all Italian businesses to compete internationally under conditions that 
are less disadvantageous in comparison with those of our competitors.  
However, the signing of the interconfederate agreement of September 21st sparked a 
heated debate that – as a result of the contradictory positions subsequently taken 
and even declarations by some of their intention not to apply those agreements in 
practice – has significantly diminished confidence in the effectiveness of Article 8.  
There is a risk, therefore, that the effectiveness of the mechanisms provided under 
the new legislation will be undermined and operating flexibility severely limited.  
Fiat, which is engaged in the creation of a major international group with 181 plants 
in 30 countries, cannot afford to operate in Italy in an environment of uncertainty 
that is so incongruous with the conditions that exist elsewhere in the industrialized 
world.  
It is for these reasons, none of which are politically motivated or connected to our 
future investment plans, that I am hereby confirming that, as indicated in our letter 
of June 30th, Fiat and Fiat Industrial have decided to withdraw from Confindustria 
with effect January 1st, 2012.  
We are evaluating the possibility of collaborating, in a form yet to be agreed, with 
several local/regional organizations belonging to Confindustria, including, in 
particular, the Unione Industriale di Torino.  
On our side, we will exercise our freedom to rigorously apply the new legislative 
provisions. Relations with our employees and with the trade unions will be 
conducted in a manner that does not infringe on any rights of workers and in full 
respect of the roles of all concerned, consistent with the agreements already 
reached at Pomigliano, Mirafiori and Grugliasco.  
This important decision was reached after long and careful consideration. It is a 
decision that we cannot back away from because we are committed to playing a 
leading role in the industrial  
development of this nation.  
Yours sincerely,  
Sergio Marchionne 
Source:http://www.fiatspa.com/  
 
Following this statement, at the end of November 2011 Fiat sent a new one to all 
involved trade union organizations to inform them about its unilateral leaving from all 
collective agreements and practices starting from 1 January 2012. Despite the 
unanimous criticism of trade unions, Fim-Cisl and Uilm-Uil declared their availability to 
join the bargaining in order to define a new collective agreement as soon as possible. 
Fiom-Cgil instead, organized several strikes and assemblies in all Fiat’s plants. Anyway, 
all the involved trade unions seated to the negotiations table for defining the new 
collective agreement who started on 29 November 2011. Fiat wanted to build the new 
agreement building upon the Pomigliano agreement, but Fiom rejected this condition 
and abandoned the bargaining table few days after. The new agreement was born on 
13 December 2011 thanks to the efforts of the Fiat company management and Fim, Uil, 
Fismic, Ugl Metalmeccanici and covers about 86,000 workers of the Fiat group in Italy. 
― As reported in Pedersini (2012), the new deal includes: 
― common group-wide minimum wage rates; 
― an increase in the Saturday overtime pay premium from 50% to 60%; 
― special yearly bonuses for achievements in the implementation of the World Class 
Manufacturing system (€200 bonus for ‘silver-level’ plants and €500 for ‘gold-level’ 
plants); 
― an extra four-year seniority pay rise, which adds to the existing five bi-annual ones; 
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― a 0.5 percentage point increase in the company’s contribution to the employees’ 
supplementary pension schemes; 
― a one-off bonus of €600 for all employees, including those in the Wage Guarantee 
Fund, to be paid in 2013; 
― a shortening of break periods from 40 to 30 minutes. The difference will be 
reimbursed in the salary; 
― an increase in the number of overtime hours the company can organise unilaterally 
from 40 (as exists in the sectoral metalworking agreement) to 120 hours; 
― a standard rota system that organises production working time over 18 shifts on 6 
days per week; 
― stricter measures on absenteeism with the aim of reducing it to 3.5%. 
Moreover, the agreement replaces the election of unitary trade union representation 
bodies (RSUs) with the appointment of company union representation bodies (RSAs) 
by the signatory unions, based on Article 19 of the Statute of Workers.  As a 
consequence, Fiom is not allowed to have company-level representatives as it hadn’t 
signed the collective agreement. After a long legal dispute, on July 3 2013, the 
Constitutional Court declared that a part of Article 19 of Act 300/1970 (the Statute of 
Workers) was “constitutionally illegitimate.”  
5. Securing employees' fate when operations are 
transferred: the example of Vodafone Italy 
The economic and financial crisis that is affecting Europe has a strong impact on 
industrial relations and it is moving the focus more and more on the management of 
restructuration and outsourcing processes.  
In 2007 the telephone company Vodafone Italy launched a referendum about the 
proposal to transfer a customer care branch employing at that time about 900 
employees. The proposal was part of an industrial plan of reorganization of Vodafone’s 
activities aimed at fostering company growth and the development of market segments 
such as voice and mobile, mobile broadband and communication services for home and 
office. In order to reach this goal, it turned out to be necessary a process of focusing 
and specialization of skills, therefore, the company decided to externalize those 
activities which required specific technical skills as administrative tasks and 
management of debts such as back office customer care that has been carried out, until 
then, directly by Vodafone in its offices in Rome, Milan, Ivrea, Padua and Naples.  
In October the two companies involved in the process, Vodafone and the service 
provider Comdata, signed a company agreement with the approval of the three 
sectoral trade unions (the Communication Workers’ Union, affiliated to Cgil; the 
Federation of Entertainment, Information and Telecommunications Workers, affiliated 
to Cisl; the Italian Communications Workers’ Union, affiliated to Uil). 
The agreement defines the conditions of the transfer with particular regard to 
protections and guarantees for the workers involved. The deal has a term of 7 years 
and the two companies are involved in guarantying full employment stability except in 
the case of voluntary resignations and dismissals for just cause. In case of bankruptcy of 
the Comdata group, Vodafone must undertake to find a third party to which all of the 
workers must be immediately transferred; alternatively, Vodafone must re-hire all of 
the workers. In addition, the outplaced workers have the right not to be transferred 
out of the municipality where they are working at the time of the transfer. 
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The main concern was the maintenance, in the medium term, of the conditions 
concerning pay and acquired benefits. With regard to contractual rights, to new 
recruits should be applied the same conditions applied to the earlier Vodafone 
employees (in order to avoid double contractual regime), while to the transferred 
workers should be ensured all the rights and economic and legal protections expected 
by the national and sectoral collective agreements, as well as the benefits provided at 
company level (e.g. meal tickets, results bonuses, extra health and pension provision). 
Moreover, Comdata agreed to launch training programs for transferred personnel in 
order to ensure skills development. 
The referendum, hold in November 2007, approved the company agreement reached 
in October with a percentage of 57.4 of the employees voting in favour of it. Anyway, 
many worker were doubtful the agreement, especially because the Vodafone’s branch 
transferred to Comdata was not organized in a single functional area before the deal 
(Tajani, 2008).   
6. Reconciling businesses' need for flexibility  
and employees' new expectations:  
the case of Luxottica in Italy 
Although the financial crisis has caused general expenditure cutbacks both in the public 
and in the private sector, the shift in the ways of life and individual needs of workers 
employed in advanced countries, as well as changes in the social and cultural context, 
are emphasizing the importance of meeting individual needs in order to improve job 
satisfaction, motivation and sense of belonging as well as managing better the work-life 
balance. For this reason, some companies have started to apply a vast range of social 
benefits and projects aimed at the people care and well being.   
The company welfare system of Luxottica is considered a “best practice” in the Italian 
industrial relations system. The company is a vertically integrated organization that 
produces and distributes prescription eyewear and sunglasses of high technical quality 
and style all over the world. The company is sited in the Veneto region, in the North-
East of Italy, and employs more than 60.000 workers worldwide. The company in fact, 
has a strong global presence in more than 130 countries and is a global leader in the 
design, manufacture and distribution of high-end, luxury and sports eyewear. The 
brand portfolio counts 45 well-known brands (Ray-Ban, Oakley, Vogue, Persol, etc.) 
and the company manages eleven plants, six of which mainly located in the North of 
Italy.  
In 2009 trade unions and the management agreed to introduce a company welfare 
system for more than 7,000 Italian white- and blue-collar workers. The 2010 benefit 
package was a first step providing financial benefits, maternity package and health 
insurance. In addition, the company-level collective agreement signed in October 2011 
integrated occupational benefits and work-life balance initiatives as promoting flexibility 
and providing life-long learning. The deal includes five days’ paid paternity leave, an 
‘hour bank’ to accumulate time off to care for newborn children and converting 
unused training hours (envisaged by the industry-wide agreement) into scholarships 
(Maino & Mallone, 2012). Some measures directed to increase the flexibility in the 
working time are an high individual control on work hours and overtime and a wider 
use of vertical and cyclical part-time arrangements in order to reduce the use of 
temporary contracts. An innovative scheme is the use of job-sharing in the case of an 
unemployed or inactive family members or employees’ children near to complete their 
education. In terms of health protection and promotion is introduced an integration up 
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100 per cent of the pay for employees absent for more that 180 days and are provided 
training programs on safety, preventive and ergonomics. In May 2013 Luxottica signed 
a new agreement aimed at extending the ‘Welfare’ scheme set up in 2009 by offering 
youth education and training, listening and advice services for employees in 
psychological or material difficulties and microcredit and solidarity opportunities. The 
framework is those of a “quality culture” oriented to limiting waste and releasing 
surplus that is reinvested into social protection (Mura, 2013b). 
7. Trying local negotiations in SMEs:  
extending Luxottica welfare system 
The Luxottica welfare system and its Corporate Social Responsibility are good 
examples of cooperation between trade unions and management in order to strength 
the productive system and also to improve compensations, services and quality of life 
for all the employees. Employers in fact, are increasingly called to provide what is no 
longer supplied by the public welfare system such as social protection and investment. 
The  structure of the Italian economy doesn’t allow the widespread introduction of 
internal welfare agreement, work-life balance, workplace facilities and investment in 
training especially in SMEs because of the cost. Even if territorial second-level 
bargaining is essentially present in the agriculture, construction and crafts sectors, the 
territorial bargaining signed by Unindustria Treviso (an employer association that 
represents the industrial and service sector companies present in Treviso, one of the 
provinces of the Veneto region) and the territorial structures of Cgil, Cisl and Uil, tries 
to introduce the “Luxottica welfare model” to the SMEs active in the area. The welfare 
project is based on the February 2011 ‘Pact for economic growth’ and introduced a 
regional system of industrial relations to foster company-level bargaining. On 13 
January 2012, Unindustria Treviso and the three trade unions reached 
an implementation agreement that provides a template for company-level agreements. 
In this way, Unindustria Treviso negotiates directly with insurance companies, service 
providers and large retailers, to offer small and medium firms the chance to offer to 
their employees welfare benefits for company-level agreements as for example 
incentives for school books of employees’ children, medical check-up and prevention 
campaigns and agreements for discount public transport passes or wellness centres. 
This allows individual employers to take advantage of cost savings, facilities and 
services that would normally only be available to large firms, and to distribute contract 
management costs among a wider number of recipients (Maino & Mallone, 2012). 
8. Involving employees in the annual working time 
procedure: Premier Foods in the UK 
In the UK, not a lot of businesses make an effort to involve employees and their 
representatives in change procedures. The UK food manufacturer Premier Foods 
produces a range of branded products for the UK market. It has more then 35 sites in 
the UK and employs over 9,000 staff in total. Its plant at Knighton, near Stafford in the 
English Midlands, employs 249 staff and manufactures custard powder, hot chocolate 
and trifle mix. It experiences a seasonal surge in demand for its products in the last few 
months of the year. To meet this demand, it used to employ temporary agency staff 
and pay overtime to regular staff. However, in 2012, it negotiated with trade unions a 
new annual hours arrangement to increase the flexibility of its shift patterns and avoid 
these expenses. The company estimates that this agreement has saved it almost £1 
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million in its first year of operation. One of the main triggers for negotiating this 
agreement was the fact that it had lost a customer contract that accounted for almost 
a quarter of the plant’s output, and did not want to make workers redundant. It opted 
instead for cutting operational costs.  
 The previous Shift System 
Under the previous system, the plant’s shift patterns remained static, despite a regular 
increase in demand for products at the end of the calendar year. Any extra labour 
flexibility had to be achieved through agency workers or overtime payments. Staff in 
the process area of the plant used to work 12-hour shifts on a four on, four off 
pattern, which allowed the plant to operate continuously. Staff in the blending and 
packing areas of the plant worked a mixture of three-shift rotations and a combination 
of double day shift and permanent night shifts over a five-day week (Monday to Friday). 
— Moving to annualized hours 
The company consulted a working time consultant, who recommended moving to an 
annual hours arrangement, which would be more flexible and better match demand. 
Under such a scheme, the number of hours that an employee works in a year is the 
same as if they had worked a constant working week, but there is flexibility to change 
the actual length of the working week in line with demand. 
The company knew that the key to establishing a successful annual hours arrangement 
is knowing not only the total number of hours required each year to meet demand, 
but also how and when demand will rise and fall over those 12 months. Having this 
‘demand forecast’ allows it to schedule its shift patterns so that staff work longer 
hours during the busiest times and shorter hours when business is slow. The company 
therefore produced a detailed demand forecasts for each of the factory’s products for 
every week of the year, based on historical sales data. This was then converted into a 
labour demand forecast in terms of actual hours. Annual hours arrangements were 
then drawn up, net of annual leave entitlement, which was managed separately. The 
arrangement for the process area of the factory was net annual working hours of 
1,896, which related to a 42-hour week. In the other area of the factory, the annual 
hours total is 1,833, which relates to a 39-hour week. 
Annual hours arrangements can also include a number of ‘reserve hours’ on top of the 
standard rostered hours to help manage any unforeseen fluctuations in demand. 
Employees are paid for these reserve hours and it is important for the company that 
these are managed tightly in order to keep extra costs to a minimum. The company 
was advised to keep around 100 hours in reserve for each worker. After one year of 
operation, this was reduced to no more than 60 hours.  
Once annual hours figure was agreed, the company analysed demand on an ongoing 
basis, and found that it rose steadily in the second half of the year – this meant that in 
March and April, with current staffing levels, staff would only need to work four days a 
week, but by November, staff would need to work a nine-day week to meet demand. 
As it is not possible to work a nine-day week, the annualised hours scheme enables 
staff to work this additional time earlier in the year by increasing production before 
the increase in demand hits. This is possible as the products the factory makes have a 
long shelf-life, although the company is careful to manage the process to ensure that it 
does not produce more surplus stock than necessary. 
 Agreeing the new arrangements 
Meetings were held with review teams on the new shift patterns. The main area of 
dislike was the lack of opportunity to work overtime and receive overtime pay. This 
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was then followed by formal consultation with trade union representatives in January 
2012, and ballot on the new arrangements in March 2012. The new system was 
endorsed by 90% of staff and came into force on 1 April 2012.  
The number and size of the teams at the factory remains constant, but the actual shift 
patterns vary greatly throughout the year, ranging from shorter shifts with more time 
off between April and July and then longer shifts from mid-September through to mid-
December.  
Achieving staff buy-in to the new arrangements was a key concern for the company, 
which therefore sought to involve employees as much as possible in the change. This 
was achieved mainly through the use of review teams in each of the four operating 
areas. It also produced Q&A documents for the trade union representatives and 
encouraged staff to ask the working time consultant any questions they may have 
about how the new arrangements would work in practice. Employees were also 
offered an incentive payment of £500 to move to the new shift patterns.  
The move to annual hours has also brought a change to the way staff are paid. Under 
the previous arrangements, staff received a weekly pay packet that could vary – 
sometimes quite substantially – due to overtime. Now they receive 12 equal monthly 
payments a year. Some staff were concerned about losing the opportunity to earn 
overtime, but generally speaking they appreciated the stability that receiving the same 
salary every month would bring.  
— Measuring the impact 
The introduction of annual hours has had a significant impact on the factory. It was 
able to retain 23 jobs that would otherwise have been made redundant, saving a 
significant amount in redundancy payments and associated costs. Further, a close 
match has been achieved between demand and staffing levels throughout the year, 
leading to a 90 per cent reduction in spend on agency staff, and an 85 per cent fall in 
overtime payments. This has significantly increased the competitiveness of this factory. 
9. Using employee engagement to steer a course 
through difficult times: Lancashire County Council in 
the UK 
Increasing employee engagement is a tool that many employers have been using during 
the recession to try to improve competitiveness in difficult times, in a context in which 
pay increases need to be kept to a minimum. In the UK public sector, organizations 
have to engage in restructuring, following public sector spending cuts. One local 
government organization, Lancashire County Council, in the north of England, has 
been focusing on employee engagement as a way of meeting savings targets and 
protecting the services that it delivers to the public.  
In 2010, the Council realized that it was going to come under severe pressure to cut 
spending by possibly as much as 25% over three years. Given the fact that this was 
likely to have a huge impact on employee morale, the Council’s chief executive decided 
that the best way forward was to engage the workforce rather than making cuts from 
the top down, by management decision. Accordingly, the Council described the 
financial challenges it faced and asked the workforce for their ideas on how to solve 
them, with the emphasis on all employees contributing to this. Trade unions were also 
engaged in the process. The Council also decided to make voluntary rather than 
compulsory redundancies, which meant that there were problems in matching skills to 
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business need. However, the Council decided that the benefits of sustained or even 
improved staff moral would far outweigh any downsides.  
The outcome of this exercise was that the Council managed to create a saving in 
excess of 25% of total costs, and this is judged to have had a positive, rather than 
negative, effect on service delivery. Employee satisfaction ratings have also improved – 
in an employee engagement survey, those stating that they enjoyed their job increased 
from 68% to 91% and those who said that they felt valued and appreciated increased 
from 34% to 52%. Further, the number of employees with zero absence records 
increased from 40% to 54%.  
Conclusion 
Similarities and differences, stakes and modalities 
 of collective bargaining in an ailing economic Europe 
What can we learn from the comparison between these four European countries to 
guide actions in the coming years?  
First, there are two series of particularly striking tensions in EU countries: 
 Tensions  between a trend to revive minimum collective guarantees (e.g. in 
Germany), and a more flexible system of collective protection (Southern Europe, 
France), up to the extreme UK case with the “zero hour contracts” 
 Tensions between a reassertion of the sectors’ regulating role and the shift of social 
standards being increasingly developed in businesses (in Italy with Fiat, in France, but 
also in Germany with the possibility of temporary derogations to collective standards)  
 However, what we can really retain from the examples of the countries analysed is 
that the crisis has brought the social stakeholders to reach realistic compromises 
[social realism] and is not driving them to toughen their actions.  
 Unionization rates are down everywhere and the union movement is becoming 
more fragmented in EU countries (including Germany), which is definitely not 
impervious to these new social regulation stakes.  
Fewer conflicts and more cooperation between the social players lead to the 
necessary compromises on topical matters in all the countries:  
 
Businesses’ competitiveness in return for a temporary employment and investment 
guarantee: the bargaining topics are the same everywhere (wage moderation, 
working time arrangements) 
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Appendix:  
1. The industrial relations framework in France 
Traditionally, France has had a strong institutional framework of industrial relations: on 
the one hand a framework for employee representation in businesses (employee 
representatives, works councils, committees on hygiene, security and working 
conditions), and a framework for protest and bargaining, where the trade unions have 
the monopoly. 
 Employee representation in businesses 
Since 1936, all businesses with at least 11 employees have to set up employee 
representatives following an election.  They primary role is to bring collective or 
individual claims to the employer.  Traditionally, employee representatives deal with 
local operational issues regarding the application of laws and collective agreements. 
In 1945 came the – elected – works council from 50 workers on.  This structure has 
prerogatives on social and cultural activities and, increasingly, the company’s good 
economic progress.  It is informed and consulted having regard to projects to carry 
out in the company.  Over the years, this representative structure has received more 
and more prerogatives.  The last to date was in June 2013 when the works council was 
consulted about the company’s strategy for the 3 years to come. 
In 1982 came another – elected – structure specialized in hygiene, security and 
working conditions (CHSCT), which has become very important because issues 
related to health at work and the work organization have become central and can have 
an impact on employees’ working conditions. 
 Union organisations in businesses 
In addition to elected employee representatives, the union organizations present in the 
company coexist. 
Since a memorable law of 2008, unions get their representativeness and the right to 
negotiate company agreements following the percentage of votes obtained during the 
professional election for the works council.  Only unions that received 10 per cent of 
the votes in this election are considered as representative and can negotiate company 
agreements. 
This recent change is fundamental for the trade unions, as some used to be 
representative simply because they were listed in a decree dating back to 1966, or for 
others because they had proven their representativeness in court… 
Once the election is over and totals are made, the union has numerous rights, 
including the possibility of bargaining with the employer. 
In businesses, there are more and more bargaining topics, often imposed by the law. 
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One of the most strategic negotiations is that on pay (1982), but many other themes 
joined (forward planning, working time arrangements, disability…), hence the 
importance for a trade union to be around the bargaining table. 
 Other bargaining levels  
In France, in addition to the corporate level, which has particularly grown recently, 
there are two other levels: 
 The industry level: more than 750 sectors, but this level has become particularly 
week in recent years in favour of company negotiations. 
 Remember that, with the extension of sectoral agreements, 98% of employees are 
covered by a sectoral collective agreement guaranteeing minimum remuneration and 
classification charts. 
 The national/cross-industry level: this level has seen the most changes in 
recent years. 
First, the Larcher Act in 2007 stated that the government should subject all social 
matters to negotiations (or at least offer it to the national social partners) before 
sending a bill to Parliament. 
This is why, now, each year, the President and Prime Minister present a social agenda 
(M. Sarkozy) or organize a Big Social Conference for two days of dialogue (M. 
Hollande), about all possible reforms, with the social partners. The latter can either 
take hold of the subject and open negotiations at national and cross-industry level, or 
leave the lawmaker to vote the laws. 
Since 2007, a lot of national cross-industry agreements (ANI) have been signed on 
matters as varied as stress, seniors, professional equality, violence at work, secure 
employment (2013) or the quality of life at work (2013). But the ANI does not 
automatically apply, it needs to go through Parliament and be made into law …which 
makes it hard to get French collective bargaining to look credible! 
2. The industrial relations framework in Germany 
 Legal Frame of collective bargaining 
The freedom of establishing social partner organisations and the right of unions, 
employers’ associations and individual companies to conclude collective agreements is 
an essential part of German industrial relations (Lesch, 2006; Lesch, 2010). It is laid 
down in Article 9 section 3 of the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany. It 
grants employees and employers the right to negotiate salaries and working conditions 
without any intervention by the government. They can form organisations coalitions in 
order to preserve and promote economic and employment conditions. The freedom 
of association does create the opportunity for empolyees and employers to join forces 
in trade unions or employers’ associations. It does, however, also allow the individual 
employee or firm to refrain from joining a union or association and to stipulate wages 
and working conditions on an individual basis.  
The collective bargaining autonomy is organised by the Collective Agreement Act 
(Tarifvertragsgesetz), the Posted Worker Act (Arbeitnehmerentsendegesetz), the 
Works Constitution Act (Betriebsverfassungsgesetz), and the Minimum Working 
Conditions Act (Mindestarbeitsbedingungsgesetz). In addition, the freedom of 
establishing social partner organisations warrants unions to call on strike and 
employers to lock out striking workers. Furthermore, industrial action is bound to be 
strictly collective, i.e. an individual employee must not strike on his or her own. Thus, 
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legal industrial action requires labour disputes having to address issues of collective 
bargaining (Kissel, 2002, 217). Properly speaking, it is regulated by court ruling which 
defines criteria applicable to such action. For example, politically motivated strikes and 
wildcat strikes are not permitted (Kissel, 2002, 245). Collective bargaining autonomy 
implicitly requires that the bargaining power of unions and employers or employers’ 
associations is balanced. Court ruling is expected to maintain the bargaining power 
balance and to prevent one bargaining party from being dominated by the other. 
 Collective bargaining level and coverage 
Collective agreements may be concluded on both the industry or sectoral level and the 
company level. Strictly speaking, collective settlements, by law, stipulate the working 
conditions only of those employees who are member of the corresponding union. 
However, it is generally said that the companies voluntarily apply the collective 
provisions also to the non-union members working in the company except those 
whose individual working contracts stipulate more favourable provisions than the 
collective agreement. 
Furthermore, collective bargaining at the sectoral level can be characterised partly by 
pattern bargaining. This holds for negotiations taking place in the various regional 
districts of one specific industry. Provisions settled in a pilot district serve as 
references which are adopted as they stand or slightly modified by the bargaining 
parties in other districts. While collective bargaining parties in the regional districts 
are, strictly speaking, autonomous actors their strategies and actual behaviour are 
somewhat coordinated. Thus, nation-wide external wage policy effects on international 
competitiveness and employment can be internalised by unions and employers’ 
associations (at least at a sectoral level). 
Collective bargaining at the firm-level is performed by the company’s management and 
the union (organised at the sectoral level or in a specific professional domain). 
According to the Works Council Constitution Act negotiations between the 
management and a works council on working conditions which are regularly stipulated 
by collective agreements are not allowed except an opening clause applies. This is due 
to the legal provision that a works council must represent the interest of all employees 
of the firm irrespective of union-membership. 
With respect to the coverage of employees, sectoral bargaining prevails. In the 
western part of Germany 90 per cent of employees covered by collective agreements 
are paid on the basis of industry-wide collective agreements (Lesch, 2010, 112). The 
corresponding figure for eastern Germany is 77 per cent. According to the IAB 
establishment panel, a total of 60 per cent of all employees in western Germany and 48 
per cent in eastern Germany were bound by sectoral and firm-level collective 
agreements in 2012 (Ellguth/Kohaut, 2013). Wages and other working conditions of 
the remaining employees may, however, be strongly influenced by the collective 
settlements or aligned with the collective provisions. This applies to roughly 50 per 
cent of the employees working in companies that are not directly bound to a sectoral 
or firm-level agreement.  
Over the last decades collective bargaining coverage has declined (IAB, 2013). Since 
the mid-1990s the share of employees adhering industry-wide collective bargaining fell 
from 70 per cent in 1996 to 53 per cent in western Germany (56 per cent to 36 per 
cent in eastern Germany). The share of employees working in stablishments governed 
by firm-level-agreements remained more or less constant at a rather low level (actually 
7 per cent in the west, 12 per cent in the east). As larger companies are more 
frequently covered by collective agreements the corresponding firms’ coverage rate is 
notably lower than the employees’ one. Likewise the latter, the former exhibits a 
decline, too. The proportion of establishments bound to a collective agreement fell 
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from 52 per cent (1995) to 34 per cent (2012) in western Germany and from 26 per 
cent (1997) to 21 per cent (2012) in eastern Germany (Kohaut/Schnabel, 1998, 4; 
Ellguth/Kohaut, 2013, 283).   
 Role of workers and unions in management (co-determination) 
— Works Councils 
According to the Works Constitution Act, employees in establishments in the private 
sector with five and more employees can elect a works council. In 2012, works 
councils existed in 9 per cent of all establishments with five or more employees 
(Ellguth/Kohaut, 2013, 286). Likewise collective bargaining coverage, the coverage of 
works councils is higher in larger establishment. Thus, the proportion of covered 
employees (42 per cent) is notably higher. The results of the latest works council 
elections held in 2010 in more than 1,000 companies show that on average 79 percent 
of the employees go to the polls (Stettes, 2011). Participation is particularly high if a 
simplified election procedure is used. In the vast majority of firms candidates are 
elected directly and individually. Thus the significance of registered candidate lists 
which represent specific groups within the workforce and can only be voted for as a 
whole is noticeably lower than in previous elections. Members’ degree of unionization 
ranges between 49 and 55 percent. It is significantly lower in service industries than in 
manufacturing. In addition, the share of union members in the works council declines 
as the proportion of female and high-skilled workers rises. It is, however, significantly 
higher in works councils where the share of reelected members is above average.  
By law, employer and works councils are to cooperate with each other in such a way 
that both the establishment and the workers benefit. Works councils are to represent 
the interest of the whole staff by being informed by the management, consulting the 
management, enforcing employees’ interest in decision making or even jointly deciding 
with the management. In this respect, they can conclude works agreements that are 
binding for both the employer and the employees. If a conflict of interests arises at the 
level of the establishment and the dispute concerns enforceable codetermination 
rights, the works council can enforce the setting-up of an arbitration committee. If a 
dispute over rights arises, the works council can apply to the labour court for an 
injunction. Finally, it is supposed to monitor compliance with laws and collective 
agreements.  
Main subjects and issues that works councils are dealing with are as follows: 
 General political objectives, such as promotion of specific groups (migrants, older 
and female workers), improving employment prospects at the establishment, and 
promoting measures in the fields of safety, environmental protection and pollution 
control 
 Labour issues, such as work rules, rules for the prevention of work accidents, 
implementation of team work, shortening or extension of regular working time, and 
the introduction and use of technical devices for monitoring employees' conduct and 
performance  
 Work organisation, work place design, implementation of new technologies  
 Safety  
 Personnel issues, such as guidelines, training, recruitment, dismissals, transfers  
 Economic issues, such as the economic and financial situation of the establishment, 
production and investment plans, relocation. In establishment with 100 and more 
workers management and works council has to form a committee where the latter is 
regularly informed by the former on the state of business and where economic issues 
are to be debated.   
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According to a representative survey by the University of Bochum, works councils are 
more frequently involved in the regulation of working time arrangements and in the 
field of dismissals than alternative bodies of interest representation, such as round 
tables, spokespersons, other types of staff committees (Hauser-Ditz et al., 2008). 
These alternative modes of interest representation are even more widespread among 
companies in manufacturing and affiliated industries than works councils (Stettes, 
2008). Voluntarily established joint committees, in which employee representatives and 
the employer share information and debate and jointly decide on important company 
policies and strategies, predominately exist in companies with up to 100 employees. 
Other forms of employee representation, such as staff spokesmen or worker 
committees, are relatively often established in companies with 101 to 199 workers. 
Moreover, alternative modes of interest representation are often complemented by 
flexible wage arrangements, such as profit-sharing and incentive schemes.  
Due to the information, consultation and enforceable codetermination rights in various 
realms of the labour relations, works councils in Germany can be deemed a powerfull 
interest representation of the employees. If they effectively und efficiently perform the 
collective-voice-function by bundling the interests of the individual workers 
(Addison/Schnabel/Wagner, 2000), reducing information asymmetries between 
management and works councils/staff (Freeman/Lazear, 1995), the implementation of a 
works council can be beneficial for the economic performance of a company. For 
example, the implementation of a short-time working time scheme or the derogation 
of collective standards in case of a crisis may be facilitated by a works council. Due to 
its information rights, its involvement in designing the scheme or its approval, the 
works council can assure the employees that the economic situation of the firm is 
severe and the adopted measure can be deemed appropriate. On the other hand, as 
works council may be inclined to protect the status quo, they may hamper 
restructuring and slow decision making processes. In this regard works councils can 
also exert an adverse impact on performance.  
According to a survey among managers and works councillors on qualitative issues of 
industrial relations at the establishment level in 2007, a trustfull atmosphere is deemed 
crucial for establishing efficient and effective cooperation (Niedenhoff, 2007, 9). That 
means in the first place that the legitimation of a works council as representative of the 
employees should not be denied by the management and its establishment should not 
be hampered. In addition, shaping a trustfull cooperative climate between management 
and the works council is regarded as an important issues concerning leadership. Of 
course, this conflict of interest may and will arise due to the different roles of the 
bodies. Managers, e.g., report more frequently than work councillors that, in particular, 
the issues restructuring and designing the wage schemes are controversial issues. 
Nonetheless, a trustfull and cooperative climate pave the way for smoothly solving 
interest conflicts. 
— Supervisory Board 
According to the Act on Co-determination (Mitbestimmungsgesetz), 50 per cent of the 
members of the supervisory board in public and private limited companies with 2,000 
and more employees are representatives of the employees. At least two of them are 
delegates from the union who, however, have to be approved by employee’ voting. 
Staff representatives and union delegates are involved in the appointment of the 
executives of the company’s management board, monitor the latter’s operations and 
may decide that specific transactions require the approval of the supervirory board 
before being performed. In public and private limited companies with 500 to 1,999 
employees one third of the supervisory board seats are allocated to workers’ 
representatives all of them have to be members of staff.  
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3. The industrial relations framework in Italy 
 The Italian context of the bargaining structure 
The Italian bargaining structure is based on three levels: national, sectoral and company 
level. The third level is based on decentralised agreements signed within companies 
that allow to increase the bargaining coverage and helps to accommodate the 
differences between large and small organizations. However, due to the increasing 
attention reserved by the bigger companies to this bargaining level, decentralized 
agreements are more common among large companies usually located in the North, 
therefore the principal level of collective bargaining in the country is the sectoral one 
(Pedersini, 2013a). Moreover, the main characteristic of the Italian economy is the 
prevalence of small and medium companies, therefore a fourth level of the bargaining 
system can be identified in the territorial level that is essentially presents in the 
agriculture, construction and crafts sectors, but it has increasingly been considered as a 
new system for providing the same welfare benefits that bigger companies provide to 
their employees also to those employed in SMEs in order to maximize costs.  
 Employment framework 
The Labour Market Report 2011-2012 (CNEL, 2012) produced by the National 
Council of Economy and Labour reveals that the structural changes in the production 
system, as for example the population aging, the feminization of the labour force, the 
shift towards the service sector and the increase in the number of foreign workers in 
certain jobs as well as the financial downturn, are modifying the characteristics of the 
labour market. 
Of the nearly 23 million employed people in Italy in 2011, 67.8% were employed in the 
service sector, 28.5% were active in manufacturing and 3.7% in the agricultural sector 
(ISTAT, 2012). The Italian economy is characterized by a large incidence of small and 
medium companies, with about 95% of the companies in the manufacturing and service 
sector having less than ten employees and only 20% of the Italian workers employed in 
companies with more than 250 employees mainly distributed in the North (ISTAT, 
2008). The country presents in fact substantial geographical differences between the 
more industrialised and developed north and the economically weaker South. There is 
a large territorial gap in terms of employment, with the employment rate of the North 
over twenty per cent higher than that of the southern, respectively at 65 and 43.8 per 
cent in 2012 (ISTAT, 2012). 
In terms of unemployment instead, according to ISTAT (2012) the overall 
unemployment rate was 10.7 in 2012 and the value has sharply increased reaching 12.8 
in the first quarter of 2013. Moreover, due to financial crisis and the extensive use of 
precarious contracts, younger workers are disadvantaged in the labour market and the 
unemployment rate for the 15-24 years range is much higher (35.3%). 
In the last decades the women’s participation rate has increased but remains generally 
low if compared with other European countries. In 2012 the 47.1 per cent among 
women in the working age were either occupied or actively looking for a job, while the 
average rate in the EU (27 countries) was 58.6 per cent (Eurostat, LFS).  
 Union and employers’ organizations landscape in Italy 
Even if it’s not possible to talk about an official tripartism, in Italy there are three major 
union confederations that are: 
• the General Confederation of Italian Workers (Cgil); 
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• the Italian Confederation of Workers’ Trade Unions (Cisl); 
• the Union of Italian Workers (Uil). 
The trade unions are mainly organized by industry and their organizational structure is 
both horizontal and vertical. The horizontal level is organized in function of territorial 
issues and is divided into district, regional and national (political trade-unionism). The 
latter includes all the trade unions that cover productive categories present in a 
specific territory. The vertical level is organized depending on the type of work sector 
of the company in which the worker enrolled in the union is employed (Del Conte, 
2007). 
Starting from the central tripartite Agreement of 23 July 1993 - that together with the 
Workers’ Statute dating from 1970 are the main sources of law and rule governing 
industrial relations in Italy - tripartite agreements have addressed a number of issues 
especially in the 90s including income policy, pension reform, labour market reform 
and economic growth. In the 2000s tripartite negotiations have become less common 
and the refusal of the Cgil to sign the agreements of 2002 and 2009 caused the 
disintegration of the trade unions’ cohesion. 
The Workers’ Statute includes the right for workers to organize a plant-level union 
representation structure (RSA), that is the main channel of employee representation. 
In addition the tripartite agreement of 1993 introduce a unitary workplace union 
structure (RSU) elected by the employees choosing from a trade unions’ list.  
The freedom of association is guaranteed by the Constitution but, according to Visser 
(2011), trade union density in Italy was above the EU27 average in 2010 - 35.1% of 
employees were members of a trade union (retired employees excluded) - and is 
experiencing a negative trend. In particular, there has been a decrease in the 
percentage of members in the private sector, while it has remained constant or has 
increased the trade union density in the public sector, as well as it has increased the 
number of foreigner workers who joined trade unions (Feltrin, 2009). The collective 
bargaining coverage instead, is about 80% with the highest percentage in metal 
manufacturing. 
In the public and transport sectors instead, the trade union representation is 
increasingly fragmented and characterized by many autonomous unions. Figures 
published by the state agency ARAN show that at the end of 2011 the union density in 
the sector was about 40%. Anyway, these 1,282,000 members were divided between 
more than 300 unions, of whom, a parte for the five largest unions in the sector (the 
schools and the general public sector unions of CGIL, CISL and UIL, as well as the 
CONFSAL affiliate in schools, SNALS, and the UGL, the General Labour Union) that 
together accounted for well over half of all the union members in the public sector, 
more than 200 unions had fewer than 100 members and 100 had fewer than ten 
(Fulton, 2013). 
The system of industrial relations in Italy is traditionally relatively conflictual with a 
strong opposition between the management, on one side, and trade unions, on the 
other side. Trade unions do not have participation rights in any boards or company’s 
decisional process. 
The most important employer confederation is the General Confederation of Italian 
Industry 
(Confindustria) that include all industrial sectors and mediates in the relationship 
between private employers and trade unions and represents them nationally for 
economic and industrial policy issues. The employer confederation representing small 
private companies is the Italian Confederation of Small and Medium sized Industry 
(Confapi), while Confartigianato and the National Confederation of Crafts and Small 
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and Medium Enterprises are the artisans’ associations, while Confagricoltura and 
Coldiretti operates in the agricultural sector.  
According to Visser (2011), as for the trade union density also the employer 
organization density - that was estimated at 58% in 2008 – have significantly weakened 
over the past two decades. 
In Italy there is no minimum wage legislation, anyway, even if the most important level 
for wage bargaining is still the sector, there is an increasing attention on the company 
level, emphasizing in this way the role and the shift towards decentralized agreements. 
Usually industry-wide agreements set minimum pay increases for all employees, while 
second-level agreements can include other variables related to wage as performance. 
Territorial second-level bargaining is essentially present in the agriculture, construction 
and crafts sectors, as well as in commerce and tourism. However, a new model of 
territorial bargaining is those signed by Unindustria Treviso (an employer association 
that represents the industrial and service sector companies present in Treviso, one of 
the provinces in the North-East of Italy) and the territorial branches of Cgil, Cisl and 
Uil aimed at introducing the “Luxottica welfare model” to SMEs in the area. In 
October 2011 Luxottica, a company leader in the design, manufacture and distribution 
of high-end, luxury and sports eyewear, signed an integrative contract for its 
employees. The goal of the Treviso’s agreement is to expand the benefits provided for 
Luxottica’s employees to all those employed in the area.  
4. The industrial relations framework in The United Kingdom 
 Legal Framework for Collective Bargaining 
Collective agreements have no legal basis in the UK, which means that they are not 
legally enforceable, in contrast to practice in many other European countries. They are 
deemed to be “binding in honour only”, depending for their ultimate enforcement on 
the sanctions available to the parties (e.g. industrial action on the employee side). 
However, certain collective agreements may become implied terms of individual 
contracts of employment. 
 Minimum wage 
Since 1999, the UK has had a national minimum wage, made up of a rate for adults aged 
21 and above, and lower rates for younger workers aged 18-20, 16-year-olds above 
school leaving age and 17-year-olds, and apprentices under 19 and older apprentices in 
the first year of apprenticeship. The minimum wage is overseen by the Low Pay 
Commission (LPC), an independent body that includes representatives of business 
groups, trade unions and academics. The LPC makes recommendations to the UK 
government on the uprating of the minimum wage. Most recently, it recommended 
below-inflation increases of 1.9% for adults and 1.0% for younger workers and 
apprentices. The UK government accepted the LPC’s recommendation and the 
increases will take effect in October 2013, bringing the adult rate to GBP 6.31 an hour. 
 Strike action 
There is no written guaranteed right to strike in the UK. If a trade union that is 
recognised and independent decides to call for industrial action that seeks to induce a 
breach of contract (i.e. workers stopping work), the union may be immune from any 
legal action it would normally face if that industrial action is “in contemplation or 
furtherance of a trade dispute”, as defined by law. The union must also hold a secret 
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ballot on industrial action and take the action within 28 days of the ballot, otherwise the 
strike will not be judged to be legal. 
The state has no power to intervene in trade disputes in the UK. However, the 
statutory body, the Advisory Conciliation and Arbitration Service (Acas) has powers to 
offer assistance by conciliation or other means, including arbitration if the parties wish. If 
conciliation fails, ACAS can refer the dispute (if the parties agree) to the Central 
Arbitration Committee (CAC), an independent permanent body, for adjudication. 
Whilst not a legal requirement, a CAC adjudication is normally accepted. 
Acas has a legal duty to offer free conciliation where a complaint about employment 
rights has been made to an employment tribunal. It can also provide mediation, 
conciliation and arbitration if the parties to a dispute request this. Acas also offers 
individual arbitration as an alternative to employment tribunal hearings 
 Level of bargaining 
Collective bargaining in the UK takes place predominantly at company level, based on 
recognition of trade unions for bargaining purposes by the individual employer. Sectoral 
and national bargaining play no meaningful role in UK collective bargaining.  
Since 1999, trade unions have had recourse to a statutory procedure if they wish to be 
considered for recognition by an employer. A union can apply to the Central Arbitration 
Committee (CAC) setting out the bargaining unit (which can be a group of employees 
or the whole of the workforce) that it wishes to be considered for recognition. The 
CAC will accept the application if at least 10% of the bargaining unit are union members 
and if it considers that the majority of the bargaining unit are likely to be in favour of 
recognition. Employers can also use the legislation to derecognise unions, although this 
has been very rare since the legislation came into force. In 2011-12, the CAC dealt with 
33 applications and accepted 24 (CAC annual report 2011-2012). If the CAC accepts an 
application, the next stage is to determine an appropriate bargaining unit. Once the unit 
is established, if more than half of the workers in this unit are members of the union, the 
CAC may order recognition. If the CAC is not satisfied that the union has majority 
membership, it arranges a ballot of workers in the unit. In certain circumstances the 
CAC may also order a ballot even where the union has majority membership. Usually, 
however, the CAC grants recognition where a majority of voters, and at least 40% of all 
workers in the bargaining unit, are in favour (Carley 2012).  
 Bargaining coverage 
Bargaining coverage is relatively low in the UK, and falling, according to the most recent 
Workplace Employment Relations Study (WERS) 2011, which was published at the 
beginning of 2013. Overall, 13% of workplaces in the UK had workers who are covered 
by collective bargaining in 2011 (ie all or part of the workforce), a fall from 16% in 2004, 
when the previous survey was carried out. However, there is a large difference between 
the public and private sectors: 58% of workplaces in the public sector have employees 
who are covered by collective bargaining (down from 70% in 2004), while only 6% of 
private sector workplaces have employees who are covered by collective bargaining, 
down from 8% in 2004.  
In terms of the number of employees covered by collective bargaining, WERS states that 
across the whole economy, 23% of employees were covered by collective bargaining in 
2011, compared with 26% in 2004. In the public sector, 44% of employees were covered 
by collective bargaining in 2011, compared with 69% in 2004. In the private sector, the 
figure was 16% in 2011, down slightly from 17% in 2004. 
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